| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Sigma Forms Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.5 via the handle_form_submission function. This is due to the plugin dynamically granting the unfiltered_upload capability to all users during form submissions and bypassing MIME type validation when allowed_file_types is not configured. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute code on the server. Several default pre-built templates including Job Application, Support Ticket, and Wholesale Application have file upload fields with no file type restrictions configured by design, making this vulnerability immediately exploitable upon installation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks
There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task
is running.
Hold refcount to avoid that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: fix guest_memory_dirty bitfield clobbered as size
Two sites in vmwgfx_resource.c assign boolean literals to
res->guest_memory_size, which is an unsigned long allocation-size
field; the intended target is the adjacent res->guest_memory_dirty
bitfield. After the assignments the field holds 0 or 1 instead of
the resource's MOB allocation size:
- vmw_resource_release() writes 0 (false), and
- vmw_resource_unbind_list() writes 1 (true).
Subsequent revalidation paths read guest_memory_size when computing
the dirty page range (vmw_bo_dirty_transfer_to_res()) and the buffer
allocation size (vmw_resource_buf_alloc()), producing zero-length
walks or wrap-around ranges that read or write past the MOB bitmap.
The dirty-tracking intent of the original code (mark the resource as
dirtied since the last sync) is also lost, since guest_memory_dirty
is never updated.
Rename both assignments to guest_memory_dirty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: j1939: transport: j1939_session_fresh_new(): initialize receive buffer
Zero the allocated buffer in j1939_session_fresh_new() to ensure it
contains no residual data.
While there is a potential performance impact if users allocate maximum
sized ETP buffers, most real-world use cases are not noticeably affected
since the maximum known buffer size is typically around 65K.
[mkl: add Message-ID] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: dat: ensure accessible eth_hdr proto field
When batadv_get_vid() accesses the proto field of the ethernet header, it
is not checking if the data itself is accessible. The caller is responsible
for it. But in contrast to other call sites, batadv_dat_get_vid() and its
caller didn't make sure this is true. This could have caused an
out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_irc: fix parse_dcc() off-by-one OOB read
parse_dcc() treats data_end as an inclusive end pointer, but its only
caller passes data_limit = ib_ptr + datalen, which points one past the
last valid byte.
The newline search loop iterates while tmp <= data_end, so when no
newline is present, *tmp is read at tmp == data_end, one byte beyond
the region filled by skb_header_pointer().
irc_buffer is kmalloc'd as MAX_SEARCH_SIZE + 1 bytes and datalen is
capped at MAX_SEARCH_SIZE, so the stray read does not fault. The byte
is uninitialized or stale; if it contains an ASCII digit, simple_strtoul
will consume it and produce a wrong DCC IP or port in the conntrack
expectation. The extra allocation byte is also a fragile guard: if the
cap or allocation size changes, this becomes a real out-of-bounds read.
Change the loop and its post-loop check to use strict less-than,
consistent with the caller's exclusive-end convention. Update the
function comment accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Fix iommu domain lifetime race during device removal
When force_iova mode is enabled, amdxdna_remove() frees xdna->domain. If
amdxdna_gem_obj_free() is called after device removal, it may attempt to
access xdna->domain, resulting in a use-after-free.
Fix the race by adding freeing xdna->domain as a managed release action,
so its lifetime is managed by DRM and remains valid until all managed
resources are released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation
skb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives
in the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot
access the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.
However, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back
over the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)
packet that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different
ways, depending on the encap type:
1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()
and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.
2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().
That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since
the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built
the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the
L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.
skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before
skb->data, warns and clears metadata:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1
RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0
bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3
run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360
bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0
lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0
ip_output+0x63/0x100
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0x9c/0x150
__napi_poll+0x2b/0x190
net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0
handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270
do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
</IRQ>
That is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that
carries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT
redirect modes:
LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
lwtunnel_input
LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
lwtunnel_output
LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
ip6_output
ip6_finish_output
ip6_finish_output2
lwtunnel_xmit
Every encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the
metadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This
single chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:
- lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local
- lwtunnel_output(): ioam6
- lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit
Alternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.
That would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become
inaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the
hook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
veth: fix NAPI leak in XDP enable error path
During XDP enablement in veth, if xdp_rxq_info_reg() or
xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() fails, the driver rolls back the changes.
However, the rollback loop:
for (i--; i >= start; i--) {
decrements the loop index 'i' before the first iteration. This
correctly skips unregistering the rxq for the failed index 'i' (as
registration failed or was already cleaned up), but it also
erroneously skips calling netif_napi_deli() for rq[i].xdp_napi.
Since netif_napi_add() was already called for index 'i', this leaves
a dangling napi_struct in the device's napi_list. When the veth
device is later destroyed, the freed queue memory (which contains the
leaked NAPI structure) can be reused.
The subsequent device teardown iterates the NAPI list and
corrupts the reallocated memory, leading to UAF.
Fix this by explicitly deleting the NAPI association for the failed
index 'i' before rolling back the successfully configured queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: emac: Fix NULL pointer dereference in emac_probe
Move devm_request_irq() after devm_platform_ioremap_resource() so that
dev->emacp is mapped before the interrupt handler can fire. An early
interrupt hitting emac_irq() would dereference the NULL dev->emacp and
crash.
Also remove redundant error message. devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
already returns an error message with dev_err_probe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Take dma_resv lock before dma_buf_unpin() in release path
dma_buf_unpin() requires the caller to hold the exporter's dma_resv
lock:
void dma_buf_unpin(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach)
{
...
dma_resv_assert_held(dmabuf->resv);
...
}
iopt_release_pages() calls dma_buf_unpin() without taking that lock,
so every iommufd_ioas_destroy()/iommufd_ioas_unmap() that releases
the last reference on a DMABUF-backed iopt_pages triggers a WARN.
This was hit while running tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd:
WARNING: drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:1137 at dma_buf_unpin+0x62/0x70
RIP: 0010:dma_buf_unpin+0x62/0x70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dma_buf_unpin+0x62/0x70
iopt_release_pages+0xe4/0x190
iopt_unmap_iova_range+0x1c7/0x290
iopt_unmap_all+0x1a/0x30
iommufd_ioas_destroy+0x1d/0x50
iommufd_fops_release+0x93/0x150
__fput+0xfc/0x2c0
__x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x65/0x180
</TASK>
Take the dma_resv lock around dma_buf_unpin() in iopt_release_pages(),
matching the iopt_map_dmabuf() convention. dma_buf_detach() acquires the
reservation lock internally, so it must remain outside the locked region. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator
A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()
only on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*
attribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation
at all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --
ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and
ntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads
attr_list_entry fixed-header fields
(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with
bounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident
attribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive
out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.
load_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),
ale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an
"al < al_start + size" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the
fixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.
Factor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),
which requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct
attr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,
that ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the
name, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.
ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries
tile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()
(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the
resident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped
validation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other
two attribute-list walks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix NULL dereference on AIBV allocation failure
The airq_iv_create() can return NULL on failure, but the return value was
never checked. If it fails, zdev->aibv will be NULL and fail when
dereferenced in kvm_zpci_set_airq(). Add a NULL check and free the
previously allocated AISB bit and zdev->aisb on failure. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This impacts an unknown function of the file /order/submit of the component Order Submission. The manipulation leads to race condition. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor deleted the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without and explanation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].
Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).
Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths
vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and
heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:
- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the
offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO
size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the
resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride *
height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow.
- The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The
loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride +
width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride < width_in_bytes),
and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.
The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a
configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported
framebuffer can reach this path.
Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO's size up front
using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk
memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride;
otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom
of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride <
width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: softing: fw_parse(): validate firmware record spans
fw_parse() reads a fixed record header, a firmware-provided payload,
and a trailing checksum without knowing the end of the firmware blob. A
truncated record can therefore make those reads exceed the blob.
The same record also supplies addresses and lengths for writes into
DPRAM. The generic loader uses wrap-prone mixed signed arithmetic for its
bounds check, while the application loader does not bound the staging
copy at all.
Pass the firmware end to the parser and validate the full source record.
Use a signed wide offset for generic DPRAM records and validate the
application staging span against the mapped DPRAM before copying. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in decompress_lznt
decompress_lznt() does not validate array index bounds before accessing
the decompression table. A corrupted NTFS3 image with invalid compressed
data can trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Add index bounds checking to prevent the OOB access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Fix OOB read in hid_get_report for numbered reports
When a caller passes a size of 0 to hid_report_raw_event() for a
numbered report, the function originally called hid_get_report() before
performing any size validation.
Inside hid_get_report(), if the report is numbered (report_enum->numbered
is true), it unconditionally dereferences data[0] to extract the report ID.
With a size of 0, this results in an out-of-bounds read or kernel panic.
Fix this by moving the numbered report size validation check before the
call to hid_get_report(), ensuring that size is at least 1 before
dereferencing the data pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: fix out-of-bounds check for cqe->len_list[]
Move index check before element access. |
