| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The BSON buffer-reservation API in the MongoDB C Driver can record a length smaller than the five-byte BSON minimum. Later append or comparison operations can underflow unsigned length calculations and read or write outside the document buffer. An actor who can influence the length supplied by an embedding application can cause the application to terminate or read or corrupt adjacent process memory. Reaching this issue requires the application to pass an undersized value to bson_reserve_buffer and then perform an affected operation. |
| An integer underflow in the KMS endpoint-parsing logic of MongoDB libmongocrypt can cause an allocation failure that terminates the application process. This can occur when an authenticated user modifies a key document in the key vault collection, or when an application accepts a KMS endpoint containing a colon after its path or query during key creation. The issue does not access memory outside its allocated bounds. |
| An integer underflow was found in the popt library when formatting help text for option tables that exceed the terminal width. A local user who can cause an application to print help under those conditions may cause that application to crash or fail to display help, resulting in a denial of service of the affected application. |
| An integer underflow in WinCursorShapeUtils::trimTransparent() in GlavSoft TightVNC Server for Windows before 2.8.88 allows a local authenticated user to crash the server, and potentially read out-of-bounds memory, by causing a cursor shape with a width or height of zero to be processed on the DXGI capture path. The loop bound width - 1 wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF, producing an access roughly 4 GB beyond the 64 KB cursor buffer; a monochrome cursor of height 1 also becomes 0 because getCursorHeight() halves the height in place. |
| A heap buffer overflow flaw was found in the SASL I/O layer of 389 Directory Server (389-ds-base). In sasl_io_start_packet(), the wrapped-record length read from the wire is validated only against an upper bound. A small wire length (0, 1, or 2) produces an encrypted_buffer_count below the already-consumed encrypted_buffer_offset, causing an unsigned subtraction underflow in sasl_io_read_packet(). PR_Recv is then requested to read approximately 4 GiB into a 1024-byte heap buffer, resulting in a heap buffer overflow with attacker-controlled content. After a successful SASL bind with integrity protection (SSF > 0), a remote authenticated attacker can cause a denial of service or potentially achieve remote code execution. This flaw is distinct from CVE-2026-11774, whose fix only guards against upper-bound overflow. |
| Dislocker through 0.7.3 contains an integer underflow vulnerability in get_vmk() and get_fvek() that allows attackers to trigger out-of-bounds heap reads via crafted datum sizes. Attackers can supply a malicious BitLocker volume image with a datum_size smaller than the 36-byte AES-CCM header, causing hexdump() to over-read and crash dislocker. |
| ieee802154_decipher_data_frame() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_frame.c computed payload_len = net_pkt_get_len(pkt) - ll_hdr_len - authtag_len without first checking that the received frame is at least ll_hdr_len + authtag_len bytes long. All three variables are uint8_t, so a frame whose payload is shorter than the configured authentication tag makes the subtraction wrap around to a large value (up to 255).
The wrapped length is passed unchanged to ieee802154_decrypt_auth() and on to the CCM operation as cipher_pkt.in_len/out_buf_max, with apkt->tag pointing at frame + ll_hdr_len + payload_len. Because the receive buffer is allocated to the exact length of the frame received from the radio driver, the crypto layer then reads several hundred bytes past the end of the packet buffer and writes the same number of decrypted bytes back over it in place. The frame's authentication tag is only verified after this processing has taken place, so no key material, association or prior authentication is needed — a single crafted short frame from any device in radio range is sufficient. Frame validation in ieee802154_validate_frame() does not prevent it: a data frame is accepted with a one-byte payload.
The result is an out-of-bounds read and an out-of-bounds write of up to roughly 240 bytes into the adjacent network-buffer pool, corrupting other packets or allocator metadata and typically faulting the target. The out-of-bounds content is not attacker-chosen (it is ciphertext XOR keystream over out-of-bounds memory) and the frame is dropped when tag verification fails, so the primary impact is memory corruption and denial of service rather than information disclosure.
Exposure is limited to configurations that enable the experimental CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_SECURITY option, select a crypto device via CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_SECURITY_CRYPTO_DEV_NAME, and have established a security session with a level other than IEEE802154_SECURITY_LEVEL_NONE; with security disabled or at level NONE the tag length is zero and no underflow occurs. The fix rejects frames shorter than ll_hdr_len + authtag_len before the subtraction, and adds the matching guard on the transmit side in ieee802154_create_data_frame(). |
| A flaw was found in sssd. A local unprivileged user could send a specially crafted request with a zero-length body to the Network Security Services (NSS) responder. This could lead to a denial-of-service condition, causing the NSS responder to become unstable or terminate. This vulnerability affects the availability of the system responder. |
| Unsigned integer underflow in wstrncat() in src/port.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH from v1.4.11 through v1.5.0 on non-Windows platforms allows an authenticated remote attacker to write one out-of-bounds null byte past the end of a stack buffer by sending a crafted SFTP path. wolfSSH_RealPath() in src/ssh.c appends each path component with a remaining-size bound (outSz - curSz) rather than the full destination size, so once the accumulated path reaches half the output buffer the size_t computation n - strlen(s1) - 1 wraps to near SIZE_MAX. The strncat() call is then effectively unbounded and copies the whole component; when that component exactly fills the remainder of the buffer, its terminating null is written one byte past the end. The caller's own length check keeps the copied data inside the buffer, so the overflow is limited to that single null byte, which may corrupt an adjacent stack value and crash the process. Applications that call the public wolfSSH_RealPath() with an output buffer smaller than the input path are additionally exposed to an unbounded copy, because the word32 expression outSz - segSz in that length check also wraps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow in EOP ring size calculation.
The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm
of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 4) - 1
But order_base_2 can in theory return 0, so this could underflow
(although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096).
Change this to
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 8)
using properties of logarithms.
Also add to the above comment to make the mathematics more clear.
(cherry picked from commit f0f43fcf8b2b3a924cad9444340921c96ed5f634) |
| On affected Arista Wi-Fi access points with Captive Portal enabled, an unauthenticated wireless client connected to a Captive-Portal-enabled SSID can crash the portal service with a crafted HTTP request. This results in a temporary denial of service until the service automatically restarts. Remote code execution is not possible. |
| An integer underflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS IKEv2 daemon (iked) allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to crash the process by sending a specially crafted encrypted IKEv2 message negotiated with an AES-GCM cipher suite. |
| An integer underflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS IKE daemon (iked) allows a remote attacker who has completed the initial IKEv2 handshake to crash the iked process by sending a specially crafted encrypted IKEv2 message, resulting in a denial of service. |
| The web management service in affected RouterOS versions contains an integer underflow in its HTTP request body handling that is reachable before authentication. This can be leveraged by an unauthenticated network attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution as root, or to cause a denial of service, using a single crafted request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write
usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu)
and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that
usr_len <= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len > off causing
an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t
value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length,
leading to out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix by reading and validating usr_len <= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids()
in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return
path acquires no reference and has no resource leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix a possible underflow
We shouldn't trust the firmware about the length of the wowlan packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: bound aligned TLV advance in FW parser
Validate ALIGN(tlv_len, 4) against remaining parser length before
consuming bytes from the firmware image.
This avoids length underflow on malformed TLVs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate IEs in cfg80211_wext_siwgenie()
The KASAN allocation trace shows that a malformed IE buffer is
stored via SIOCSIWGENIE (cfg80211_wext_siwgenie()) without any
validation. The crash trace shows that a subsequent SIOCSIWESSID
triggers a connection attempt which calls cfg80211_sme_get_conn_ies()
to process the stored IE buffer, causing:
- An out-of-bounds read in skip_ie() which reads ies[pos+1]
(the length byte) past the end of the 1-byte buffer.
- An integer underflow in the memcpy size argument when offs
returned by ieee80211_ie_split() exceeds ies_len, causing
unsigned subtraction to wrap to SIZE_MAX and triggering a
fortify panic.
Fix this by validating the IE buffer in cfg80211_wext_siwgenie()
before storing it.
[drop unnecessary ie_len check, update commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Ensure array index tg_inst won't be -1
[WHY & HOW]
tg_inst will be a negative if timing_generator_count equals 0, which
should be checked before used.
This fixes 2 OVERRUN issues reported by Coverity. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound), Out-of-bounds write vulnerability in Apache Thrift C++ 32 bit THeaderTransport.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
