| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MongoDB Schema Manager and MongoDB Atlas SQL ODBC Driver do not validate the scheme of the authorization and token endpoints returned by an OIDC issuer's discovery document. A user induced to connect to an uncontrolled MongoDB deployment using MONGODB-OIDC authentication may have an uncontrolled URI dispatched to their operating system's default protocol handler, potentially exposing credentials or, under certain conditions, resulting in code execution in the user's context. |
| The device's update mechanism retrieves metadata for software updates over an unencrypted HTTP connection and stores portions of that metadata for later use. A management interface subsequently returns this stored value in a JSON response, and the web interface responsible for displaying update information inserts that value directly into the page as HTML. This behavior allows attacker‑controlled metadata to be interpreted as script content. In addition, the same authenticated origin provides an interface capable of executing system‑level commands with root privileges. An attacker able to influence update metadata could exploit these conditions to execute arbitrary code within the administrative context of the device. |
| IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper validation of paths during archive extraction. |
| IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to command injection in the certificate export CLI functionality, allowing a privileged authenticated CLI user to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. |
| IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to path traversal and arbitrary file deletion in the Datasource REST component. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to delete files and potentially cause denial of service or impact system integrity. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, the device includes a legacy password hash on the serial console that relies on a weak DES‑based encryption. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, two user‑information endpoints can reveal sensitive device and account details under conditions that are not intended for normal operation. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, an unauthenticated network check function can be triggered to probe arbitrary hosts from the device’s internal network. This may expose internal information or leak data via DNS queries. |
| In Anjvision YSSD-RTMP-H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, an empty-body POST to /setUserConfig, dispatched through the web server's SOAP-RPC handler, silently downgrades the administrator password to the default value and corrupts the in-memory authentication state until the device reloads. The handler does not verify the session's privilege level, so any authenticated user can trigger it. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, an internal debug interface can be enabled through an undocumented pathway, exposing functions not intended for normal operation. When activated, this interface allows actions that could unintentionally provide elevated system access. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, the firmware embeds hardcoded cloud‑API credentials that are shared across deployed devices. Anyone obtaining the public firmware package can reuse these values to interact with the cloud service in ways not intended for normal operation. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, both the local and cloud update mechanisms apply new firmware without any cryptographic verification, relying only on basic hashing. This design allows an attacker who can reach the update routine to introduce untrusted firmware images that the device will accept as valid. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, a hidden debug interface can be enabled through an authenticated request, allowing additional commands to be sent to a backend service. Once active, this pathway can unintentionally expose system‑level functionality that could be misused if crafted inputs reach the underlying command handler. |
| In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, several ONVIF service endpoints process management requests without enforcing required authentication. This could allow an unauthorized attacker to access sensitive device operations. |
| In Baicells Nova 430H, an unauthenticated device within radio range can send a malformed uplink message during connection setup that contains an invalid NAS payload. Because the eNodeB does not properly validate this payload, it forwards the message to the core network, which can trigger a shutdown of the signaling association for the cell. This results in a temporary service disruption until the eNodeB and core network re-establish connectivity. |
| On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the
ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated
peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing
ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first
packet. |
| Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded). |
| NetX Secure TLS accepts an empty application-data record without verifying its message authentication code. In `_nx_secure_verify_mac`, a decrypted application record whose length equals the negotiated MAC size is treated as valid and returns success after advancing the receive sequence number. The received MAC is never generated or compared.
Empty TLS application-data records are legal, and are commonly emitted by TLS 1.0 implementations as a BEAST mitigation. |
| When NetX Secure is built with `NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR`, every TLS record sent on an active session is wiped after it has been handed to TCP. By then the TCP layer owns the packet chain and may already have released it to the packet pool. The wipe therefore writes zeros into packets that are free or in use by another thread, and when a reused packet's pointers no longer describe the old data, the length of the wipe underflows and it runs past the end of the packet pool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix readahead synchronisation issues by loading all folios upfront
There are some synchronisation issues that derive from the app thread
adding more folios to the rolling buffer whilst the collector thread is
looking at them or trying to clear them, such as determining the setting of
front_folio_order when the next folio hasn't been added yet,
The reason for the rolling buffer approach is that loading the buffer
upfront and then dropping all the refs just acquired is quite a slow
operation, and loading progressively allows some of the cost to be deferred
until after at least some of the I/O is started.
Instead, a better way is to load all the folios into the rolling buffer
upfront - and then drop the refs later, once the I/O is in progress. (Even
better would be for the refs not to be there at all.)
Fix this by changing the rolling buffer loader to load all the folios
selected by the VM for readahead upfront into the folio queue. The folio
queue is allocated a batch worth at a time as we don't know how many folios
are involved (the readahead_control struct, alas, has a page count, not a
folio count).
The folio refs acquired from readahead are then dropped in bulk once the
first subrequest is dispatched as it's quite a slow operation. The
collector waits for NETFS_RREQ_NEED_PUT_RA_REFS to be cleared so that it
doesn't unlock folios before the xarray has been scanned for them.
This simplifies the buffer handling later and isn't noticeably slower as
the xarray doesn't need to be modified and the folios are all already
pre-locked. |
