| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers
Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds
PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue)
and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the
callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and
that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized.
Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly
overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA
Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming
network data into the uninitialized iterator.
Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pppoe: drop PFC frames
RFC 2516 Section 7 states that Protocol Field Compression (PFC) is NOT
RECOMMENDED for PPPoE. In practice, pppd does not support negotiating
PFC for PPPoE sessions, and the current PPPoE driver assumes an
uncompressed (2-byte) protocol field. However, the generic PPP layer
function ppp_input() is not aware of the negotiation result, and still
accepts PFC frames.
If a peer with a broken implementation or an attacker sends a frame with
a compressed (1-byte) protocol field, the subsequent PPP payload is
shifted by one byte. This causes the network header to be 4-byte
misaligned, which may trigger unaligned access exceptions on some
architectures.
To reduce the attack surface, drop PPPoE PFC frames. Introduce
ppp_skb_is_compressed_proto() helper function to be used in both
ppp_generic.c and pppoe.c to avoid open-coding. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sit: reload inner IPv6 header after GSO offloads
ipip6_tunnel_xmit() caches the inner IPv6 header pointer at function
entry and continues using it after iptunnel_handle_offloads().
For GSO skbs, iptunnel_handle_offloads() calls skb_header_unclone().
When the skb header is cloned, skb_header_unclone() can call
pskb_expand_head(), which may move the skb head. The pskb_expand_head()
contract requires pointers into the skb header to be reloaded after the
call.
If the later skb_realloc_headroom() branch is not taken, SIT uses the
stale iph6 pointer to read the inner hop limit and DS field. That can
read from a freed skb head after the old head's remaining clone is
released.
Reload iph6 after the offload helper succeeds and before subsequent
reads from the inner IPv6 header. Keep the existing reload after
skb_realloc_headroom(), since that branch can also replace the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
greybus: raw: fix use-after-free on cdev close
This addresses a use-after-free bug when a raw bundle is disconnected
but its chardev is still opened by an application. When the application
releases the cdev, it causes the following panic when init on free is
enabled (CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y):
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 139 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd0/0x130
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cdev_put+0x18/0x30
__fput+0x255/0x2a0
__x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The cdev is contained in the "gb_raw" structure, which is freed in the
disconnect operation. When the cdev is released at a later time,
cdev_put gets an address that points to freed memory.
To fix this use-after-free, convert the struct device from a pointer to
being embedded, that makes the lifetime of the cdev and of this device
the same. Then, use cdev_device_add, which guarantees that the device
won't be released until all references to the cdev have been released.
Finally, delegate the freeing of the structure to the device release
function, instead of freeing immediately in the disconnect callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: anycast: insert aca into global hash under idev->lock
syzbot reported a splat [1]: a slab-use-after-free in
ipv6_chk_acast_addr(), which walks the global inet6_acaddr_lst[] hash
under RCU and dereferences a struct ifacaddr6 that has already been
freed while still linked in the hash, so a later reader walks into a
dangling node.
In __ipv6_dev_ac_inc() the aca is allocated with refcount 1, then
aca_get() bumps it to 2 to keep it alive across the unlocked region.
It is published to idev->ac_list under idev->lock, but
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() runs after write_unlock_bh(). A concurrent
teardown (ipv6_ac_destroy_dev() from addrconf_ifdown(), under RTNL)
can slip into that window:
CPU0 __ipv6_dev_ac_inc CPU1 ipv6_ac_destroy_dev (RTNL)
------------------------------ ------------------------------------
aca_alloc() refcnt 1
aca_get() refcnt 2
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
add aca to ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
pull aca off ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
ipv6_del_acaddr_hash(aca)
hlist_del_init_rcu() is a no-op,
aca is not in the hash yet
aca_put() refcnt 2->1
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash(aca)
aca now inserted into the hash
aca_put() refcnt 1->0
call_rcu(aca_free_rcu) -> kfree(aca)
The hash removal becomes a no-op because the insertion has not
happened yet, so once CPU0 inserts and drops the last reference, the
aca is freed while still linked in inet6_acaddr_lst[], and readers
dereference freed memory after the slab slot is reused.
This window opened once RTNL stopped serializing the join path against
device teardown. Move ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() inside the idev->lock
section so the ac_list and hash insertions are atomic with respect to
teardown: a racing remover now either misses the aca entirely or finds
it in both lists.
acaddr_hash_lock is now nested under idev->lock, which is acquired in
softirq context, so switch all acaddr_hash_lock sites to spin_lock_bh()
to avoid the irq lock inversion reported in [2].
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a01df04303c131efbf3a
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a194ef7.ba3b1513.1890b4.0000.GAE@google.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: Fix use-after-free in metadata dst teardown
airoha_metadata_dst_free() runs metadata_dst_free() which frees the
metadata_dst with kfree() immediately, bypassing the RCU grace period.
In the RX path, skb_dst_set_noref() sets a non-refcounted pointer from
the skb to the metadata_dst. This function requires RCU read-side
protection and the dst must remain valid until all RCU readers complete.
Since metadata_dst_free() calls kfree() directly, an use-after-free can
occur if any skb still holds a noref pointer to the dst when the driver
tears it down.
Replace metadata_dst_free() with dst_release() which properly goes
through the refcount path: when the refcount drops to zero, it schedules
the actual free via call_rcu_hurry(), ensuring all RCU readers have
completed before the memory is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: Fix use-after-free in metadata dst teardown
mtk_free_dev() calls metadata_dst_free() which frees the metadata_dst
with kfree() immediately, bypassing the RCU grace period.
In the RX path, skb_dst_set_noref() sets a non-refcounted pointer from
the skb to the metadata_dst. This function requires RCU read-side
protection and the dst must remain valid until all RCU readers complete.
Since metadata_dst_free() calls kfree() directly, a use-after-free can
occur if any skb still holds a noref pointer to the dst when the driver
tears it down.
Replace metadata_dst_free() with dst_release() which properly goes
through the refcount path: when the refcount drops to zero, it schedules
the actual free via call_rcu_hurry(), ensuring all RCU readers have
completed before the memory is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload
__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs->ra_newskb under
drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out
of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs->ra_newskb
without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:
if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && first_skb != xtfs->ra_newskb)
Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running
iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete
reassembly, NULL xtfs->ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then
evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb
operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.
Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether
first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The
flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the
pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff
first_skb was stored in ra_newskb). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx()
Fix the race by pruning the bin while still holding xfrm_policy_lock,
before dropping it. Use __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() directly since
the lock is already held. The wrapper xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin()
becomes unused and is removed.
Race:
CPU0 (XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) CPU1 (XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
========================== ==========================
xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup()
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol)
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret)
// wide window, lock not held
xfrm_hash_rebuild():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush():
kfree_rcu(bin) // bin freed
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin)
// UAF: bin is freed |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add pskb_may_pull() to skb_gro_receive_list()
skb_gro_receive_list() calls skb_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb)) without
first ensuring the data is in the linear area via pskb_may_pull(). When
the skb arrives via napi_gro_frags(), skb_headlen can be 0 (all data in
page fragments) while skb_gro_offset is non-zero (after IP+TCP header
parsing). The skb_pull() then decrements skb->len by skb_gro_offset
but skb->data_len stays unchanged, hitting BUG_ON(skb->len < skb->data_len)
in __skb_pull().
The UDP fraglist GRO path already contains this guard at
udp_offload.c:749. Adding it to skb_gro_receive_list() itself provides
centralized protection for all callers (TCP, UDP, and any future
protocols), and ensures the precondition of skb_pull() is satisfied
before it is called.
On pskb_may_pull() failure, set NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1 so the
skb is not held as a new GRO head and is instead delivered through the
normal receive path, matching the UDP handling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list
mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list() sizes its firmware command buffer using
the PF's log_max_current_uc/mc_list capabilities. When querying a VF
vport with a larger configured max (via devlink), the firmware response
can overflow this buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list+0x453/0x4c0 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 4 at addr ff1100013ffc8a12 by task kworker/u96:2/385
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 385 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009)
Workqueue: mlx5_esw_wq esw_vport_change_handler [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
print_report+0x176/0x4e4
kasan_report+0xc8/0x100
mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list+0x453/0x4c0 [mlx5_core]
esw_update_vport_addr_list+0x2e3/0xda0 [mlx5_core]
esw_vport_change_handle_locked+0xa1f/0x1060 [mlx5_core]
esw_vport_change_handler+0x6a/0x90 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x87f/0x15e0
worker_thread+0x62b/0x1020
kthread+0x375/0x490
ret_from_fork+0x4dc/0x810
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Fix by querying the vport's own HCA caps to size the buffer correctly.
Refactor the function to allocate and return the MAC list internally,
removing the caller's dependency on knowing the correct max. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: guard timestamp cmsgs to real error queue skbs
skb_is_err_queue() treats PACKET_OUTGOING as the sole marker for an skb
from sk_error_queue. That assumption is not true for AF_PACKET sockets:
outgoing packet taps are also delivered to packet sockets with
skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING, but their skb->cb is owned by AF_PACKET
instead of struct sock_exterr_skb.
If such an skb is received with timestamping enabled, the generic
timestamp cmsg path can read AF_PACKET control-buffer state as
sock_exterr_skb::opt_stats. With SO_RXQ_OVFL enabled, the packet drop
counter overlaps opt_stats. An odd drop count makes the path emit
SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS with skb->len and skb->data. For non-linear
skbs this copies past the linear head and can trigger hardened usercopy or
disclose adjacent heap contents.
Keep skb_is_err_queue() local to net/socket.c, but make it verify that
the PACKET_OUTGOING marker is paired with the sock_rmem_free destructor
installed by sock_queue_err_skb(). AF_PACKET receive skbs use normal
receive ownership and no longer pass as error-queue skbs, while legitimate
sk_error_queue entries keep the PACKET_OUTGOING marker and sock_rmem_free
ownership. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_vti: fix incorrect tunnel matching in vti6_tnl_lookup()
In vti6_tnl_lookup(), when an exact match for a tunnel fails,
the code falls back to searching for wildcard tunnels:
- Tunnels matching the packet's local address, with any remote address
wildcard remote).
- Tunnels matching the packet's remote address, with any local address
(wildcard local).
However, vti6 stores all these different types of tunnels in the same
hash table (ip6n->tnls_r_l) prone to hash collisions.
The bug is that the fallback search loops in vti6_tnl_lookup() were
missing checks to ensure that the candidate tunnel actually has
a wildcard address. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mvpp2: sync RX data at the hardware packet offset
mvpp2 programs the RX queue packet offset, so hardware writes received
data at dma_addr + MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM. The current CPU sync starts at
dma_addr and only covers rx_bytes + MVPP2_MH_SIZE bytes, which syncs the
unused headroom and misses the same number of bytes at the packet tail.
On non-coherent DMA systems this can leave the CPU reading stale cache
contents for the end of the received frame.
Use dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu() with MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM as the range
offset so the sync covers the Marvell header and packet data actually
written by hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mvpp2: limit XDP frame size to the RX buffer
mvpp2 has short and long BM pools, and short pool buffers can be smaller
than PAGE_SIZE. The XDP path nevertheless initializes every xdp_buff with
PAGE_SIZE as frame size.
XDP helpers use frame_sz to validate tail growth and to derive the hard
end of the data area. Advertising PAGE_SIZE for short buffers can let
bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() grow a packet past the real allocation, corrupting
memory or later tripping skb tailroom checks.
Initialize the XDP buffer with bm_pool->frag_size so XDP tailroom matches
the actual buffer backing the packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mvpp2: refill RX buffers before XDP or skb use
The RX error path returns the current descriptor buffer to the hardware
BM pool. That is only valid while the driver still owns the buffer.
mvpp2_rx_refill() can fail after the current buffer has been handed to
XDP or attached to an skb. In those cases mvpp2_run_xdp() may have
recycled, redirected, or queued the page for XDP_TX, and an skb free also
retires the data buffer. Returning such a buffer to BM lets hardware DMA
into memory that is no longer owned by the RX ring.
Refill the BM pool before handing the current buffer to XDP or to the
skb. If the allocation fails there, drop the packet and return the
still-owned current buffer to BM, preserving the pool depth. Once the
refill succeeds, later local drops retire/free the current buffer instead
of returning it to BM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_tunnel: fix use-after-free on object destroy
nft_tunnel_obj_destroy() calls metadata_dst_free() which directly
kfree()s the metadata_dst, ignoring the dst_entry refcount. Packets
that took a reference via dst_hold() in nft_tunnel_obj_eval() and
are still queued (e.g. in a netem qdisc) are left with a dangling
pointer. When these packets are eventually dequeued, dst_release()
operates on freed memory.
Replace metadata_dst_free() with dst_release() so the metadata_dst
is freed only after all references are dropped. The dst subsystem
already handles metadata_dst cleanup in dst_destroy() when
DST_METADATA is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Add bounds checks for firmware log indices
Add validation that read and write indices in the firmware log buffer
are within valid bounds (< data_size) before using them. If
out-of-bounds indices are encountered (from firmware), clamp them to
safe values instead of proceeding with invalid offsets.
This prevents potential out-of-bounds buffer access when firmware
supplies invalid log indices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix handling of XN[0] when !FEAT_XNX
XN has already been extracted from its bitfield position so using
FIELD_PREP() on the mask that clears XN[0] is completely broken, having
the effect of unconditionally granting execute permissions...
Fix the obvious mistake by manipulating the right bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL
A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time. |
