| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing:
1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c),
use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte,
filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and
return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to
Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow.
2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >=
ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet
header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short
AF_PACKET TX frames. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source
The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered
source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read
locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn
address.
Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without
modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and
route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish
a replacement bind with a wildcard local address.
Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing
the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while
dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU
slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind
allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: release the GEM object on virtio_gpu_vram_create() errors
virtio_gpu_vram_create() frees the object with a bare kfree(vram) on
both error paths after drm_gem_private_object_init() has run, and on the
second one after drm_gem_create_mmap_offset() has linked obj->vma_node
into the device's VMA offset manager. The freed object stays in that
interval tree, so a later lookup or insertion walks freed memory, and
the dma_resv and gpuva lock are never destroyed.
Call drm_gem_object_release() before kfree() on both paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix object leak in virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl()
virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl() calls drm_gem_object_release() on the
drm_gem_handle_create() error path instead of dropping the reference it
owns, so obj->funcs->free() never runs and the virtio_gpu_object, its
pages and sg table, the resource id and the host-side resource are
leaked.
Use drm_gem_object_put() instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: discard post-EOF pagecache when extending a file via zero range
smb3_zero_range() removed the pagecache only for the range being zeroed,
so when it extends the file the folio straddling the old EOF - which may
hold data dirtied past EOF through an mmap - was never dropped and became
visible as file content once the file was extended.
Lower the discard boundary to the smaller of the zero-range offset and the
old EOF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix object leak when drm_gem_handle_create() fails
virtio_gpu_gem_create() owns the reference taken by
virtio_gpu_object_create(). On the drm_gem_handle_create() error path it
calls drm_gem_object_release() instead of dropping that reference.
drm_gem_object_release() is the inverse of drm_gem_object_init() and does
not touch the reference count or call obj->funcs->free(), so it is only
correct as the last step of a destructor, as in
virtio_gpu_cleanup_object(). Using it here leaves the bo at refcount 1
with no remaining reference, so virtio_gpu_free_object() never runs and
the shmem pages, sg table and virtio_gpu_object are leaked. Since
virtio_gpu_object_create() has already set bo->created,
VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_UNREF is not queued either, leaking the host-side
resource and the resource id.
drm_gem_handle_create_tail() drops the handle reference on all of its
internal error paths, so the caller only has to drop its own. Use
drm_gem_object_put(), matching the success path below. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.
A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from
the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.
Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header
that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an
Ethernet header.
A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one,
previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as
received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: Handle maximum standalone channels
Standalone channels use one NAPI vector for each Tx and Rx queue.
fbnic's allocation path excludes FBNIC_MAX_TXQS from that layout. A
64-Tx/64-Rx configuration therefore records 128 vectors but allocates
only 64, leaving NULL entries that resource setup dereferences.
Include the maximum vector count in standalone allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: unregister net_devices in case of probe failure
If register_netdev() fails for one of the MTK_MAX_DEVS devices in
mtk_probe(), the error path jumps to err_deinit_ppe, skipping
mtk_unreg_dev(). The previously registered net_devices are then freed by
mtk_free_dev() while still in NETREG_REGISTERED state, hitting the
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNREGISTERED).
Route the register_netdev() failure to err_unreg_netdev so the net_devices
registered so far are properly unregistered before being freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gue: reject invalid REMCSUM offsets
The REMCSUM option carries an absolute checksum start and checksum field
offset. gue_remcsum() passes them to skb_remcsum_process(), whose
partial path stores offset - start in the u16 skb->csum_offset variable.
If offset is less than start, this underflows.
A forwarded packet can retain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and reach a NETIF_F_HW_CSUM
driver which trusts the metadata, leading skb_copy_and_csum_dev() to write
two bytes about 64 KiB beyond the destination buffer.
Reject reversed tuples in validate_gue_flags(), after the existing length
validation, so all GUE parsers enforce the ordering in one place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: don't WARN on benign flow_offload_alloc() failure
flow_offload_alloc() returns NULL when the conntrack entry is dying
(e.g. raced with a conntrack flush) or when the GFP_ATOMIC allocation
fails; both are expected under load and neither is a kernel bug. This
path runs from softirq on every committed packet, so with
panic_on_warn=1 an unprivileged user can panic the box just by racing
a conntrack flush against a `tc ... action ct commit` classifier.
Reproduced with a custom repro under QEMU: a small, fixed set of UDP
flows through `tc filter ... action ct commit` on lo, raced against
threads flooding bare ctnetlink CT_DELETE (flush) requests. Hits
WARNING: net/sched/act_ct.c:437 (tcf_ct_flow_table_add(), inlined
into tcf_ct_act() in this build) within ~15s on the unpatched kernel;
same setup is clean on the patched kernel. The fix itself is
behavior-preserving: both branches already did `goto err_alloc`
before and after, only the WARN is removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Make post-verification instruction rewrites killable
After do_check() returns, the verifier runs several instruction rewrite
passes. Some of them patch or remove one instruction at a time. Each
operation moves the remaining instruction and auxiliary-data arrays and
adjusts all branch offsets, making the overall work quadratic in the
program length.
A privileged loader can submit 131072 unconditional jumps by zero followed
by a valid return. Verification finishes quickly, but bpf_opt_remove_nops()
then spends a long time removing each jump separately. Since this
post-verification work neither checks for signals nor reschedules, a pending
SIGKILL cannot terminate the task until the rewrite finishes.
Make bpf_patch_insn_data() and verifier_remove_insns() common cancellation
and rescheduling points. These helpers run from BPF_PROG_LOAD process
context, and bpf_patch_insn_data() can already sleep while reallocating
auxiliary data.
Report interrupted constant blinding as -EINTR and propagate it through
both JIT paths, including kernels that permit interpreter fallback.
Other blinding failures retain the existing fallback behavior.
This does not reduce the quadratic cost of the rewrite passes, but it makes
the work preemptible and allows a killed loader to be torn down promptly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix manual hash table handle IDR aliasing
A u32 hash table created with an explicit handle ('tc filter add ...
handle 801: u32 divisor N') keys its IDR entry on the raw handle, while
the destroy paths free it under handle2id(handle). The two key domains
disagree for handles in the 0x800..0xFFF htid range:
handle2id() folds them back into the auto-allocated id space (1..0x7FF).
A manual table therefore leaves its raw-keyed IDR entry unreachable on
delete (a permanent leak), and its delete can drop the idr entry of an
unrelated live auto table. A later auto allocation can then hand out a
handle that aliases the live manual table; u32_lookup_ht() first-match
routes lookups and TCA_U32_LINK for that htid to the wrong table.
Key the divisor-path alloc on handle2id(handle) so allocation and
removal share one key domain. A manual handle that maps onto an id
already in use is rejected with -ENOSPC, and auto allocation skips ids
held by live manual tables.
Conditions to recreate:
ip link add test0 type dummy
tc qdisc add dev test0 clsact
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 \
handle 801: u32 divisor 16
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 2 u32 divisor 16
tc -d filter show dev test0 ingress | grep 'fh 801:'
# unpatched: two live tables with handle 0x80100000 (the pref 2 root
# hnode is auto-allocated id 1); patched: the auto hnode takes id 2.
Also tested with a poc with a live u32 table on the block, add/delete a manual
table 'handle 901: u32 divisor 1' twice; unpatched, the re-add fails with
-ENOSPC because the raw key leaked on the first delete. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: Dequeue pending mesh_send_sync entries on cancel
In send_cancel(), pending mesh_tx objects are removed from the
hdev->mesh_pending list and freed via mesh_send_complete(). However, if
a mesh transmission was already queued onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list via
mesh_next(), the queued entry retains a raw pointer to mesh_tx.
When hci_cmd_sync_work later processes the entry, it attempts to execute
mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete using
the already freed mesh_tx pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by invoking hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the
target mesh_tx before completing it. If the entry is found and dequeued,
its destroy callback will complete and free the object; otherwise,
mesh_send_complete() is called directly.
Additionally, ensure the transmission queue advances after cancellation
or errors. In mesh_send_start_complete(), call mesh_next() on error
unless err is -ECANCELED, because hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() holds
hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock and calling mesh_next() synchronously would
deadlock. Instead, advance the queue in send_cancel() once the lock is
released and if no transmission is in progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fs/xattr: don't assume the inode is locked in path_unlink/path_rmdir
bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked() makes the verifier rewrite
bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() to the _locked variants, which assume
that the caller already holds the inode's i_rwsem. The path_unlink and
path_rmdir hooks are listed, but security_path_unlink() and
security_path_rmdir() run before vfs_unlink()/vfs_rmdir() take the
victim inode's i_rwsem, so a sleepable BPF LSM program attached to
either hook mutates the victim's xattrs without the lock held.
Drop the two path hooks from d_inode_locked_hooks so that the verifier
keeps the locking bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() variants, which take
the lock themselves. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/boot: Disable trapping of PMZR_EL0 writes to EL2
__init_el2_fgt2() writes one mask to both HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
PMZR_EL0 is write-only, so its trap bit, nPMZR_EL0, exists only in
HDFGWTR2_EL2 and is therefore never set: a PMZR_EL0 write from the host
traps to EL2, where the nVHE hypervisor has no handler and BUG()s. The
kernel never writes PMZR_EL0, but kernel.perf_user_access=1 has the PMU
driver set PMUSERENR_EL0.UEN for a task with a user-read event, so a
write from EL0 reaches the trap and takes the host down without a panic
message.
Accumulate the HDFGWTR2_EL2 bits separately, as __init_el2_fgt() already
does for HDFGWTR_EL2, and set nPMZR_EL0 with the other FEAT_PMUv3p9
bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user
controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0
as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through
(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).
0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps
(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.
The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1,
so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and
[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster
links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this
doesn't blow up for everyone.
What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():
p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));
hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback
unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns
the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:
if (interval < hrtimer_resolution)
interval = hrtimer_resolution;
So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding
sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the
socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.
The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with
TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer
implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net:
af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not
as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned
short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a
0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly
as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer
conversion turned it into.
(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path
returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)
Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by
default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):
int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, ...);
int v = TPACKET_V3;
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));
struct tpacket_req3 req = {
.tp_block_size = 0x10000000,
.tp_block_nr = 1,
.tp_frame_size = 2048,
.tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,
.tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,
};
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));
Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the
existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a
different fix, just say so and I'll respin. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error
When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
packet via chunk->transport.
sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc->peer.last_data_from away from
the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk
makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register
asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport unconditionally, undoing
the redirection with the just-removed transport.
Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the
transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the
dangling last_data_from. A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer)
makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (->param_flags and friends), and
sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed
object and link it into the live transport list. This is a
use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local
unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities required:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_do_sm+0x498a/0x5660
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1e356c by task poc/115
Call Trace: sctp_do_sm <- sctp_assoc_bh_rcv <- sctp_inq_push <-
sctp_rcv <- ip_protocol_deliver_rcu <- ip_rcv
Allocated: sctp_transport_new <- sctp_assoc_add_peer <-
sctp_process_init (INIT-ACK processing)
Freed: kfree <- sctp_transport_destroy_rcu <- rcu_core
(call_rcu queued by sctp_transport_put at end of sctp_rcv)
The buggy address is located 364 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte
region [ffff88800e1e3400, ffff88800e1e3800), cache kmalloc-1k
Note that commit 03a9d10ecf71 ("sctp: drop a chunk if its transport
was removed") only covers the window between the receive lookup and
the chunk processing (e.g. an ASCONF DEL-IP racing the socket backlog);
here the transport is removed *while* the packet is being processed,
by an earlier chunk of the same packet, so the drop in sctp_inq_push()
does not reach this path. Verified with the bundled [ERROR(Stale
Cookie)][DATA] + FWD-TSN reproducer: the KASAN report above still
fires with that commit applied, and is gone with this patch on top.
Fix it by discarding the rest of the packet on this path, as suggested
by Xin. After the stale-cookie ERROR has sent the association back to
COOKIE-WAIT and removed the non-primary transports, the remaining
chunks of the packet can only run against the restarted handshake
while referencing the removed arrival transport through
chunk->transport: besides the last_data_from registration above,
sctp_cmd_setup_t2() and the sctp_make_*() reply builders would also
copy that pointer into association-lifetime state that
sctp_assoc_rm_peer() has already sanitized. Let the peer retransmit
them, in line with what sctp_inq_push() does for chunks whose
transport was removed before processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue
tcp_write_collapse_fence() sets TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1 on
tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) to prevent skbs queued after a switch to
device encryption from being collapsed into earlier skbs.
The fence is a no-op if all earlier data has already been transmitted
when the switch happens: sk->sk_write_queue is empty. The not yet
acknowledged earlier skbs wait in sk->tcp_rtx_queue with eor 0.
On a subsequent retransmit or SACK shift, tcp_retrans_try_collapse() or
tcp_shift_skb_data() can then merge an skb queued after the switch into
one queued before it.
Both users of the fence are affected:
- psp: devices only encrypt skbs with skb->decrypted set. The merged skb
keeps decrypted = 0 from the earlier skb, so merged data sent after
psp_sock_assoc_set_tx() is retransmitted in cleartext.
- tls device offload: the merged skb straddles the start marker set in
tls_set_device_offload(). The software fallback (fill_sg_in() returns
-EINVAL) and the mlx5, nfp and funeth drivers cannot handle such an
skb and drop it. Every retransmit rebuilds the same skb, so the
connection stalls.
Fix this in two places, for defense in depth:
1. Fall back to tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk) in tcp_write_collapse_fence()
when tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) is NULL.
2. Check !skb_cmp_decrypted(to, from) in tcp_skb_can_collapse(), as
tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx() does on receive. skb_shift(), which both
collapse paths call, already has a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() for this
condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow
Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked).
However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:
1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked
passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
all future group broadcasts on the socket.
2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender
transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt.
However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's
m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale
value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed
by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same
round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.
Fix this by:
- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero.
- Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where
m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly
sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member
can acknowledge at most once per round.
Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()
(where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does
not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed
in a separate patch. |
