| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| concurrent-ruby is a modern concurrency tools for Ruby. Prior to 1.3.7, Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock can incorrectly grant a write lock after one thread acquires the read lock 32,768 times. The lock stores a thread's local read and write hold counts in one integer. The low 15 bits are used for the read hold count, and bit 15 is used as WRITE_LOCK_HELD. After 32,768 reentrant read acquisitions, the local read count crosses into the write-lock bit. try_write_lock then treats the thread as already holding a write lock and returns true without setting the global RUNNING_WRITER bit. This breaks the core mutual-exclusion guarantee: the caller is told it has a write lock, but other threads can still hold or acquire read locks at the same time. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.7. |
| libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Prior to version 1.1.0, a crafted H.265 bitstream with large SPS dimensions and 16-bit bit depth causes a signed integer overflow in `de265_image_get_buffer()` (`libde265/image.cc:128`). The overflow wraps the plane allocation size to a small value (~1 KB), but the subsequent `fill_image()` call computes the real size using `size_t`, writing ~4 GB into the undersized heap buffer. Version 1.1.0 patches the issue. |
| MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime() can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed tokenSize includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a stackalloc operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes. A very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException, terminating the host process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in storeAtts. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in addBinding. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in getAttributeId. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in XML_ParseBuffer because it lacked a check that was present in XML_Parse. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in copyString. |
| libexpat before 2.8.2 has an integer overflow in doProlog that is related to storeEntityValue and entity textLen. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, an integer overflow in ht_undo_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_ht.cpp leads to a heap-buffer overflow when decoding a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file. decode->channels[i].width (int32_t) is multiplied by bytes_per_element in 32-bit signed arithmetic. With large widths (e.g., >= 536870912 for FLOAT data), this overflows, producing a corrupted offset that is later used for pointer arithmetic and can cause a heap out-of-bounds write. The same unchecked multiplication pattern appears in two other HTJ2K paths (bytes-per-line accumulation and pixel-line pointer advancement). As with related CVE-2026-34378 through CVE-2026-34589 fixes in other codecs, validating only after the multiplication is too late because the value may already be overflowed. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12. |
| ImageMagick before 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.x before 6.9.13-40 contains an integer overflow in the PSB (PSD v2) RLE decoding path (ReadPSDChannelRLE in coders/psd.c) that causes a heap out-of-bounds read on 32-bit builds. Processing a crafted PSB file can lead to information disclosure or a crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-thin: fix metadata refcount underflow
There's a bug in dm-thin in the function rebalance_children. If the
internal btree node has one entry, the code tries to copy all btree
entries from the node's child to the node itself and then decrement the
child's reference count.
If the child node is shared (it has reference count > 1), we won't free
it, so there would be two pointers to each of the grandchildren nodes.
But the reference counts of the grandchildren is not increased, thus the
reference count doesn't match the number of pointers that point to the
grandchildren. This results in "device mapper: space map common: unable
to decrement block" errors.
Fix this bug by incrementing reference counts on the grandchildren if the
btree node is shared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check
nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply() validates each relocation with
if (r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size)
but reloc_bo_offset is __u32 (uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h) and the integer
literal 4 promotes to unsigned int, so the addition is performed in 32
bits and wraps before the comparison against the size_t bo size.
Cast to u64 so the addition happens in 64-bit arithmetic.
[ Add Fixes: tag. - Danilo ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix unsigned underflow in z_erofs_lz4_handle_overlap()
Some crafted images can have illegal (!partial_decoding &&
m_llen < m_plen) extents, and the LZ4 inplace decompression path
can be wrongly hit, but it cannot handle (outpages < inpages)
properly: "outpages - inpages" wraps to a large value and
the subsequent rq->out[] access reads past the decompressed_pages
array.
However, such crafted cases can correctly result in a corruption
report in the normal LZ4 non-inplace path.
Let's add an additional check to fix this for backporting.
Reproducible image (base64-encoded gzipped blob):
H4sIAJGR12kCA+3SPUoDQRgG4MkmkkZk8QRbRFIIi9hbpEjrHQI5ghfwCN5BLCzTGtLbBI+g
dilSJo1CnIm7GEXFxhT6PDDwfrs73/ywIQD/1ePD4r7Ou6ETsrq4mu7XcWfj++Pb58nJU/9i
PNtbjhan04/9GtX4qVYc814WDqt6FaX5s+ZwXXeq52lndT6IuVvlblytLMvh4Gzwaf90nsvz
2DF/21+20T/ldgp5s1jXRaN4t/8izsy/OUB6e/Qa79r+JwAAAAAAAL52vQVuGQAAAP6+my1w
ywAAAAAAAADwu14ATsEYtgBQAAA=
$ mount -t erofs -o cache_strategy=disabled foo.erofs /mnt
$ dd if=/mnt/data of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()
The argument count calculation in create_dirty_log() performs
`*args_used = 2 + param_count` before validating against argc. When a
user provides a param_count close to UINT_MAX via the device mapper
table string, this unsigned addition wraps around to a small value,
causing the subsequent `argc < *args_used` check to be bypassed.
The overflowed param_count is then passed as argc to dm_dirty_log_create(),
where it can cause out-of-bounds reads on the argv array.
Fix by comparing param_count against argc - 2 before performing the
addition, following the same pattern used by parse_features() in the
same file. Since argc >= 2 is already guaranteed, the subtraction is
safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point
normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to
signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests
do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally
do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit
43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a
call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit
this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and
it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even
though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the
NOWAIT case.
This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application
is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state
due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck
waiting for nr_pending to == 0.
Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:
crash> struct r10conf
barrier = 1,
nr_pending = {
counter = -41
},
nr_waiting = 15,
nr_queued = 0,
Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other
requests stuck in wait_barrier():
md1_resync
[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0
[<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0
[<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110
[<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4
[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220
[<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180
[<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000
[<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230
[<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390
[<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40
[<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80
[<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120
[<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400
[<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| Moby is an open source container framework. Prior to version 29.3.1, a security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon's privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user. Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all. This issue has been patched in version 29.3.1. |
| Issue summary: A signed integer overflow when sizing the destination
buffer for Unicode output in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() can lead to a heap
buffer overflow.
Impact summary: A heap buffer overflow may lead to a crash or possibly
attacker controlled code execution or other undefined behaviour.
In ASN1_mbstring_copy() and ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() the destination
size for Unicode output is computed in a signed int: by left shift
of the input character count for BMPSTRING (UTF-16) and
UNIVERSALSTRING (UTF-32), and by summing per-character byte counts
for UTF8STRING. The calculation overflows when the input reaches
around 2^30 characters. In the worst case (UNIVERSALSTRING at 2^30
characters) the size wraps to zero, OPENSSL_malloc(1) is called, and
the subsequent character copy writes several gigabytes past the
one-byte allocation.
X.509 certificate processing routes through ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(),
whose DIRSTRING_TYPE mask excludes UNIVERSALSTRING and whose per-NID
size limits cap the input length; no network protocol or
certificate-handling path in OpenSSL exercises the overflow.
Triggering the bug requires an application that calls
ASN1_mbstring_copy() or ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() directly, or registers
a custom string type via ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(), with
attacker-controlled input on the order of half a gigabyte or more.
For these reasons this issue was assigned Low severity.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by
this issue, as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module
boundary. |
| Use after free in Windows SDK allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| An integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If a remote attacker gains an administrator account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to compromise the security of the system.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions:
QTS 5.2.9.3410 build 20260214 and later
QuTS hero h5.2.9.3410 build 20260214 and later
QuTS hero h5.3.4.3500 build 20260520 and later
QuTS hero h6.0.0.3397 build 20260206 and later |
