| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg’s ALS audio decoder, where it does not properly check for memory allocation failures. This can cause the application to crash when processing certain malformed audio files. While it does not lead to data theft or system control, it can be used to disrupt services and cause a denial of service. |
| FFmpeg version n6.1 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the draw_block_rectangle function of libavfilter/vf_codecview.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause undefined behavior or a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted input. |
| FFmpeg version n6.1 was discovered to contain an improper validation of array index vulnerability in libavcodec/cbs_h266_syntax_template.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause undefined behavior within the application. |
| FFmpeg version n6.1.1 was discovered to contain a heap use-after-free via the av_hwframe_ctx_init function. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in FFmpeg version n6.1-3-g466799d4f5, allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) via the af_dialoguenhance.c:261:5 in the de_stereo component. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.n6.1-3-g466799d4f5 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the ff_bwdif_filter_intra_c function in the libavfilter/bwdifdsp.c:125:5 component. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.n6.1-3-g466799d4f5 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the config_eq_output function in the libavfilter/asrc_afirsrc.c:495:30 component. |
| A vulnerability was found in FFmpeg up to 7.0.1. It has been classified as critical. This affects the function pnm_decode_frame in the library /libavcodec/pnmdec.c. The manipulation leads to heap-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 7.0.2 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273651. |
| Unchecked Return Value, Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in FFmpeg allows Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable. This vulnerability is associated with program files https://github.Com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/blob/master/libavfilter/af_pan.C .
This issue affects FFmpeg: 7.1.
Issue was fixed: https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b5b6391d64807578ab872dc58fb8aa621dcfc38a
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b5b6391d64807578ab872dc58fb8aa621dcfc38a This issue was discovered by: Simcha Kosman |
| FFmpeg n6.1.1 has a vulnerability in the AVI demuxer of the libavformat library which allows for an integer overflow, potentially resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. |
| FFmpeg n7.0 is affected by a Double Free via the rkmpp_retrieve_frame function within libavcodec/rkmppdec.c. |
| FFmpeg n6.1.1 has an Out-of-bounds Read via libavcodec/ppc/vp8dsp_altivec.c, static const vec_s8 h_subpel_filters_outer |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg's DASH playlist support. This vulnerability allows arbitrary HTTP GET requests to be made on behalf of the machine running FFmpeg via a crafted DASH playlist containing malicious URLs. |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg. This vulnerability allows unexpected additional CPU load and storage consumption, potentially leading to degraded performance or denial of service via the demuxing of arbitrary data as XBIN-formatted data without proper format validation. |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg's TTY Demuxer. This vulnerability allows possible data exfiltration via improper parsing of non-TTY-compliant input files in HLS playlists. |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg's HLS demuxer. This vulnerability allows bypassing unsafe file extension checks and triggering arbitrary demuxers via base64-encoded data URIs appended with specific file extensions. |
| It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again.
Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset.
The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels.
If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8.
If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8.
The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data.
We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
