| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix type confusion via race condition when using ipc_msg_send_request
req->handle is allocated using ksmbd_acquire_id(&ipc_ida), based on
ida_alloc. req->handle from ksmbd_ipc_login_request and
FSCTL_PIPE_TRANSCEIVE ioctl can be same and it could lead to type confusion
between messages, resulting in access to unexpected parts of memory after
an incorrect delivery. ksmbd check type of ipc response but missing add
continue to check next ipc reponse. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: iscsi_tcp: Fix UAF during logout when accessing the shost ipaddress
Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui.
During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress
attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this:
[ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088
[ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3
[ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[ 276.944470] Call Trace:
[ 276.944943] <TASK>
[ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7
[ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f
[ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0
[ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80
[ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0
[ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020
[ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0
[ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0
[ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222
[ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222
[ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
[ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58
[ 276.960536] </TASK>
[ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209:
[ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90
[ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140
[ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi]
[ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170
[ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170
[ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209:
[ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
[ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210
[ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360
[ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi]
[ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.974248] ___sys_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
counter: interrupt-cnt: Drop IRQF_NO_THREAD flag
An IRQ handler can either be IRQF_NO_THREAD or acquire spinlock_t, as
CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING warns:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.18.0-rc1+git... #1
-----------------------------
some-user-space-process/1251 is trying to lock:
(&counter->events_list_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: counter_push_event [counter]
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{2:2}
no locks held by some-user-space-process/....
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: some-user-space-process 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 PREEMPT
Call trace:
show_stack (C)
dump_stack_lvl
dump_stack
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
counter_push_event [counter]
interrupt_cnt_isr [interrupt_cnt]
__handle_irq_event_percpu
handle_irq_event
handle_simple_irq
handle_irq_desc
generic_handle_domain_irq
gpio_irq_handler
handle_irq_desc
generic_handle_domain_irq
gic_handle_irq
call_on_irq_stack
do_interrupt_handler
el0_interrupt
__el0_irq_handler_common
el0t_64_irq_handler
el0t_64_irq
... and Sebastian correctly points out. Remove IRQF_NO_THREAD as an
alternative to switching to raw_spinlock_t, because the latter would limit
all potential nested locks to raw_spinlock_t only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix NULL dereference on root when tracing inode eviction
When evicting an inode the first thing we do is to setup tracing for it,
which implies fetching the root's id. But in btrfs_evict_inode() the
root might be NULL, as implied in the next check that we do in
btrfs_evict_inode().
Hence, we either should set the ->root_objectid to 0 in case the root is
NULL, or we move tracing setup after checking that the root is not
NULL. Setting the rootid to 0 at least gives us the possibility to trace
this call even in the case when the root is NULL, so that's the solution
taken here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: sh: rz-dmac: fix device leak on probe failure
Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up the ICU device
during probe also on probe failures (e.g. probe deferral). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: check validation of fault attrs in f2fs_build_fault_attr()
- It missed to check validation of fault attrs in parse_options(),
let's fix to add check condition in f2fs_build_fault_attr().
- Use f2fs_build_fault_attr() in __sbi_store() to clean up code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Sanitise num_phys
Information is stored in mr_sas_port->phy_mask, values larger then size of
this field shouldn't be allowed. |
| Stack buffer overflow in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.153 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit stack corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation
The syscall number is a user-controlled value used to index into the
syscall table. Use array_index_nospec() to clamp this value after the
bounds check to prevent speculative out-of-bounds access and subsequent
data leakage via cache side channels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
Problem description
-------------------
DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device
and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn't make sense.
There are two distinct problems.
1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases
the elevated refcount on the conduit's kobject. Nominally, the OF and
non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference
counts taken, and it is already suspicious that
dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in
dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue
exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command
"before" and "after" applying this patch:
(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2)
echo 0000:00:00.2 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind
we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch
applied:
kobject: 'eno2' (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: '109' (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF),
it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived,
but in this case stale, cpu_dp->conduit pointer. Holding the net
device's underlying kobject isn't actually of much help, it just
prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject
directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being
unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold()
and dev_put()).
Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on
user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with
the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings"), via netdev_upper_dev_link().
But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial
of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time
during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn't know
about it.
So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to
prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev
tracker having acquired the reference.
Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() /
dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not
make user port errors fatal"), and the cpu_dp->conduit pointers
remain valid. I haven't audited all call paths to see whether they
will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they
do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is
associated to, and we can get into a situation where we've moved all
user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to
it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn't let it go nonetheless
- see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit()
and LAG conduits which disappear.
We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU
port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a
reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.
As for the conduit's kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don't
care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device
object itself.
History and blame attribution
-----------------------------
The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to
follow and properly attribute a blame, but I'll try to make a short
history which I hope to be correct.
We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 i
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header
If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying
to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to
header fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cdrom: rearrange last_media_change check to avoid unintentional overflow
When running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer wrap
sanitizer we encounter this splat:
[ 366.015950] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c:2361:33
[ 366.021089] -9223372036854775808 - 346321 cannot be represented in type '__s64' (aka 'long long')
[ 366.025894] program syz-executor.4 is using a deprecated SCSI ioctl, please convert it to SG_IO
[ 366.027502] CPU: 5 PID: 28472 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1
[ 366.027512] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 366.027518] Call Trace:
[ 366.027523] <TASK>
[ 366.027533] dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
[ 366.027899] handle_overflow+0x171/0x1b0
[ 366.038787] ata1.00: invalid multi_count 32 ignored
[ 366.043924] cdrom_ioctl+0x2c3f/0x2d10
[ 366.063932] ? __pm_runtime_resume+0xe6/0x130
[ 366.071923] sr_block_ioctl+0x15d/0x1d0
[ 366.074624] ? __pfx_sr_block_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 366.077642] blkdev_ioctl+0x419/0x500
[ 366.080231] ? __pfx_blkdev_ioctl+0x10/0x10
...
Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the
kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been
changed [1] in the newest version of Clang. It was re-enabled in the
kernel with Commit 557f8c582a9ba8ab ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow
sanitizer").
Let's rearrange the check to not perform any arithmetic, thus not
tripping the sanitizer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: Prevent illegal clock reduction in HS200/HS400 mode
When operating in HS200 or HS400 timing modes, reducing the clock frequency
below 52MHz will lead to link broken as the Rockchip DWC MSHC controller
requires maintaining a minimum clock of 52MHz in these modes.
Add a check to prevent illegal clock reduction through debugfs:
root@debian:/# echo 50000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/mmc0/clock
root@debian:/# [ 30.090146] mmc0: running CQE recovery
mmc0: cqhci: Failed to halt
mmc0: cqhci: spurious TCN for tag 0
WARNING: drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c:797 at cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818, CPU#1: kworker/1:0H/24
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-00001-g09db0998649d-dirty #204 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3588 EVB1 V10 Board (DT)
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
pstate: 604000c9 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818
lr : cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix early read unlock of page with EOF in middle
The read result collection for buffered reads seems to run ahead of the
completion of subrequests under some circumstances, as can be seen in the
following log snippet:
9p_client_res: client 18446612686390831168 response P9_TREAD tag 0 err 0
...
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[1] DOWN TERM f=192 s=0 5fb2/5fb2 s=5 e=0
...
netfs_collect_folio: R=00001b55 ix=00004 r=4000-5000 t=4000/5fb2
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00004-00004 read-done
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00004-00004 read-unlock
netfs_collect_folio: R=00001b55 ix=00005 r=5000-5fb2 t=5000/5fb2
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00005-00005 read-done
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00005-00005 read-unlock
...
netfs_collect_stream: R=00001b55[0:] cto=5fb2 frn=ffffffff
netfs_collect_state: R=00001b55 col=5fb2 cln=6000 n=c
netfs_collect_stream: R=00001b55[0:] cto=5fb2 frn=ffffffff
netfs_collect_state: R=00001b55 col=5fb2 cln=6000 n=8
...
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[2] ZERO SUBMT f=000 s=5fb2 0/4e s=0 e=0
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[2] ZERO TERM f=102 s=5fb2 4e/4e s=5 e=0
The 'cto=5fb2' indicates the collected file pos we've collected results to
so far - but we still have 0x4e more bytes to go - so we shouldn't have
collected folio ix=00005 yet. The 'ZERO' subreq that clears the tail
happens after we unlock the folio, allowing the application to see the
uncleared tail through mmap.
The problem is that netfs_read_unlock_folios() will unlock a folio in which
the amount of read results collected hits EOF position - but the ZERO
subreq lies beyond that and so happens after.
Fix this by changing the end check to always be the end of the folio and
never the end of the file.
In the future, I should look at clearing to the end of the folio here rather
than adding a ZERO subreq to do this. On the other hand, the ZERO subreq can
run in parallel with an async READ subreq. Further, the ZERO subreq may still
be necessary to, say, handle extents in a ceph file that don't have any
backing store and are thus implicitly all zeros.
This can be reproduced by creating a file, the size of which doesn't align
to a page boundary, e.g. 24998 (0x5fb2) bytes and then doing something
like:
xfs_io -c "mmap -r 0 0x6000" -c "madvise -d 0 0x6000" \
-c "mread -v 0 0x6000" /xfstest.test/x
The last 0x4e bytes should all be 00, but if the tail hasn't been cleared
yet, you may see rubbish there. This can be reproduced with kafs by
modifying the kernel to disable the call to netfs_read_subreq_progress()
and to stop afs_issue_read() from doing the async call for NETFS_READAHEAD.
Reproduction can be made easier by inserting an mdelay(100) in
netfs_issue_read() for the ZERO-subreq case.
AFS and CIFS are normally unlikely to show this as they dispatch READ ops
asynchronously, which allows the ZERO-subreq to finish first. 9P's READ op is
completely synchronous, so the ZERO-subreq will always happen after. It isn't
seen all the time, though, because the collection may be done in a worker
thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Fix memory leak in posix_clock_open()
If the clk ops.open() function returns an error, we don't release the
pccontext we allocated for this clock.
Re-organize the code slightly to make it all more obvious. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Fix kernel crash due to PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
When userspace does PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, but Supm extension is not
available, the kernel crashes:
Oops - illegal instruction [#1]
[snip]
epc : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
ra : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x74/0x15a
epc : ffffffff80011ace ra : ffffffff80011a30 sp : ffffffc60039be10
[snip]
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000010a79073 cause: 0000000000000002
set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
__riscv_sys_prctl+0x352/0x73c
do_trap_ecall_u+0x17c/0x20c
andle_exception+0x150/0x15c
Fix it by checking if Supm is available. |
| GStreamer before 1.4.5, as used in Mozilla Firefox before 38.0, Firefox ESR 31.x before 31.7, and Thunderbird before 31.7 on Linux, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted H.264 video data in an m4v file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: uprobes: Add missing fence.i after building the XOL buffer
The XOL (execute out-of-line) buffer is used to single-step the
replaced instruction(s) for uprobes. The RISC-V port was missing a
proper fence.i (i$ flushing) after constructing the XOL buffer, which
can result in incorrect execution of stale/broken instructions.
This was found running the BPF selftests "test_progs:
uprobe_autoattach, attach_probe" on the Spacemit K1/X60, where the
uprobes tests randomly blew up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: free routing table on probe failure
If complete = true in dsa_tree_setup(), it means that we are the last
switch of the tree which is successfully probing, and we should be
setting up all switches from our probe path.
After "complete" becomes true, dsa_tree_setup_cpu_ports() or any
subsequent function may fail. If that happens, the entire tree setup is
in limbo: the first N-1 switches have successfully finished probing
(doing nothing but having allocated persistent memory in the tree's
dst->ports, and maybe dst->rtable), and switch N failed to probe, ending
the tree setup process before anything is tangible from the user's PoV.
If switch N fails to probe, its memory (ports) will be freed and removed
from dst->ports. However, the dst->rtable elements pointing to its ports,
as created by dsa_link_touch(), will remain there, and will lead to
use-after-free if dereferenced.
If dsa_tree_setup_switches() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, which is entirely
possible because that is where ds->ops->setup() is, we get a kasan
report like this:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mv88e6xxx_setup_upstream_port+0x240/0x568
Read of size 8 at addr ffff000004f56020 by task kworker/u8:3/42
Call trace:
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
mv88e6xxx_setup_upstream_port+0x240/0x568
mv88e6xxx_setup+0xebc/0x1eb0
dsa_register_switch+0x1af4/0x2ae0
mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8
mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60
mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8
really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8
__driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298
driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258
__device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350
Allocated by task 42:
__kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x298/0x490
dsa_switch_touch_ports+0x174/0x3d8
dsa_register_switch+0x800/0x2ae0
mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8
mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60
mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8
really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8
__driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298
driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258
__device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350
Freed by task 42:
__kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x68
kfree+0x138/0x418
dsa_register_switch+0x2694/0x2ae0
mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8
mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60
mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8
really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8
__driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298
driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258
__device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350
The simplest way to fix the bug is to delete the routing table in its
entirety. dsa_tree_setup_routing_table() has no problem in regenerating
it even if we deleted links between ports other than those of switch N,
because dsa_link_touch() first checks whether the port pair already
exists in dst->rtable, allocating if not.
The deletion of the routing table in its entirety already exists in
dsa_tree_teardown(), so refactor that into a function that can also be
called from the tree setup error path.
In my analysis of the commit to blame, it is the one which added
dsa_link elements to dst->rtable. Prior to that, each switch had its own
ds->rtable which is freed when the switch fails to probe. But the tree
is potentially persistent memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Replace Mutex with Spinlock for RLCG register access to avoid Priority Inversion in SRIOV
RLCG Register Access is a way for virtual functions to safely access GPU
registers in a virtualized environment., including TLB flushes and
register reads. When multiple threads or VFs try to access the same
registers simultaneously, it can lead to race conditions. By using the
RLCG interface, the driver can serialize access to the registers. This
means that only one thread can access the registers at a time,
preventing conflicts and ensuring that operations are performed
correctly. Additionally, when a low-priority task holds a mutex that a
high-priority task needs, ie., If a thread holding a spinlock tries to
acquire a mutex, it can lead to priority inversion. register access in
amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw especially in a fast code path is critical.
The call stack shows that the function amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw is being
called, which attempts to acquire the mutex. This function is invoked
from amdgpu_sriov_wreg, which in turn is called from
gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb.
The [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] indicates that a thread is trying to
acquire a mutex while it is in a context that does not allow it to sleep
(like holding a spinlock).
Fixes the below:
[ 253.013423] =============================
[ 253.013434] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 253.013446] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE
[ 253.013464] -----------------------------
[ 253.013475] kworker/0:1/10 is trying to lock:
[ 253.013487] ffff9f30542e3cf8 (&adev->virt.rlcg_reg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[ 253.013815] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 253.013827] context-{4:4}
[ 253.013835] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/10:
[ 253.013847] #0: ffff9f3040050f58 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[ 253.013877] #1: ffffb789c008be40 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[ 253.013905] #2: ffff9f3054281838 (&adev->gmc.invalidate_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x198/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.014154] stack backtrace:
[ 253.014164] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14
[ 253.014189] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 253.014203] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/18/2024
[ 253.014224] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 253.014241] Call Trace:
[ 253.014250] <TASK>
[ 253.014260] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[ 253.014275] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 253.014287] __lock_acquire+0xa47/0x2810
[ 253.014303] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 253.014321] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[ 253.014333] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[ 253.014562] ? __lock_acquire+0xa6b/0x2810
[ 253.014578] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[ 253.014591] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[ 253.014782] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[ 253.014795] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 253.014808] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[ 253.014822] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[ 253.015012] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 253.015029] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 253.015044] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 253.015057] amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[ 253.015249] amdgpu_sriov_wreg+0xc5/0xd0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.015435] gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x44b/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.015667] gfx_v11_0_hw_init+0x499/0x29c0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.015901] ? __pfx_smu_v13_0_update_pcie_parameters+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 253.016159] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 253.016173] ? smu_hw_init+0x18d/0x300 [amdgpu]
[ 253.016403] amdgpu_device_init+0x29ad/0x36a0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.016614] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[ 253.0170
---truncated--- |
