| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mshv: Fix race in mshv_irqfd_deassign
mshv_irqfd_deactivate() and the hlist traversal of pt_irqfds_list
require pt->pt_irqfds_lock to be held, but mshv_irqfd_deassign()
omits it. This races with the EPOLLHUP path in mshv_irqfd_wakeup(),
which does take the lock before calling mshv_irqfd_deactivate().
Additionally, mshv_irqfd_deactivate() uses hlist_del() which poisons
the node pointers rather than resetting them. Since
mshv_irqfd_is_active() relies on hlist_unhashed() (checks pprev ==
NULL), a poisoned node still appears active. If a concurrent path calls
mshv_irqfd_deactivate() again on the same irqfd, the guard fails to
prevent a double hlist_del() on poisoned pointers.
Fix both issues:
- Add the missing spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq around the list
traversal in mshv_irqfd_deassign(), matching mshv_irqfd_release().
- Use hlist_del_init() instead of hlist_del() so the node is properly
marked as unhashed after removal, making the is_active guard reliable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt
When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in
ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in
sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read
async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a
record that did not authenticate breaks the connection.
tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in
for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it
skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to
reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A
splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that
recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read.
Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers
do. |
| The base directory (spring.cloud.config.server.svn.basedir) used by the Spring Cloud Config Server to clone SVN repositories to is susceptible to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks.
Spring Cloud Config 5.0.0 - 5.0.4
Spring Cloud Config 4.3.0 - 4.3.4
Spring Cloud Config 4.0.0 - 4.2.8
Spring Cloud Config 3.1.14 and earlier |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.7.2, non-admin operators (role user) can set allow_private: true on their own managed webhook subscription (POST/PATCH /api/v1/webhook-subscriptions). No admin check exists on this field. At delivery time, allow_private switches the dispatcher to an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the private/loopback/link-local SSRF guard — letting a low-privilege operator make the server request internal addresses. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.2. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.3.0 to before version 0.5.0, the nebula-mgmt Web UI host-creation path ignores both the server-wide enrollment_token_ttl security setting and per-network network_config.enrollment_token_ttl overrides. API host creation and token-regeneration paths use the configured TTL resolver, but POST /ui/hosts hardcodes now.Add(24 * time.Hour) for newly minted agent enrollment tokens. In deployments that intentionally reduce enrollment-token lifetime, any authenticated operator who can create a host through the Web UI can still mint a bearer enrollment token valid for about 24 hours. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0. |
| Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Spring Spring Cloud Config allows Webhook requests to Spring Cloud Config Server's /monitor endpoint are not validated.
This issue affects Spring Cloud Config: from 5.0.0 through 5.0.4, from 4.3.0 through 4.3.4, from 4.0.0 through 4.2.8, and through 3.1.14. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.2.0 to before version 0.5.0, when OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the operator_sessions table (the token column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours. Anyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8. |
| Flowise before 3.1.4 fails to validate chatflow visibility in the unauthenticated text-to-speech endpoint, allowing attackers to abuse private chatflow TTS credentials. Unauthenticated attackers can generate unlimited text-to-speech audio using stored OpenAI or ElevenLabs API keys by providing a valid chatflow UUID, incurring costs on the chatflow owner's account. |
| Flowise before 3.1.3 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability in the vm2 JavaScript sandbox that allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by exploiting moment locale validation bypass. Attackers can craft a fake String object with a match function that bypasses path traversal checks to load and execute malicious JavaScript files stored in the document store outside the sandbox. |
| Applications using AesBytesEncryptor with the two-argument constructor or when passing a null IV generator and CBC as the encryption mode encrypt data with AES/CBC using a null (all-zero) initialization vector.
Spring Security 7.1.0
Spring Security 7.0.0 - 7.0.6
Spring Security 6.5.0 - 6.5.11
Spring Security 6.4.0 - 6.4.18
Spring Security 5.8.0 - 5.8.27
Spring Security 5.7.0 - 5.7.25 |
| Flowise versions before 3.1.3 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in the Custom MCP node when CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL is set to stdio, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands by manipulating environment variables and command arguments. Attackers can abuse PYTHONWARNINGS and BROWSER environment variables with python3, or leverage the root working directory with node to bypass validation and execute system commands. |
| Dynamic destination cache size is not properly bound in Spring Cloud Stream.
Spring Cloud Stream 5.0.0 - 5.0.2
Spring Cloud Stream 4.3.0 - 4.3.3
Spring Cloud Stream 4.2.0 - 4.2.6 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: restore nofs context unconditionally in xfs_trans_roll
When __xfs_trans_commit() fails in xfs_trans_roll(), the NOFS context
is cleared but only restored in the success path. This leaves the
error path without nofs protection, causing a circular lock dependency
between xfs_nondir_ilock_class and fs_reclaim:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class);
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class);
lock(fs_reclaim);
Fix this by moving xfs_trans_set_context() before the error check so
that nofs context is always restored on the new transaction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix NULL pointer dereference in nvmet_execute_identify_nslist()
When a host issues an Identify command with CNS 07h (Active Namespace ID
List for a specific I/O Command Set), nvmet_execute_identify_nslist() is
called with match_css set. The command-set filter dereferences req->ns,
but this handler never calls nvmet_req_find_ns(), so req->ns is always
NULL (nvmet_req_init() resets it to NULL). As soon as an enabled
namespace with an NSID greater than the requested value exists,
req->ns->csi dereferences a NULL pointer and oopses.
Besides the crash, the comparison is logically wrong: to filter the list
by command set it must test the command set of the namespace being
iterated, not a single fixed value. Use the loop variable ns->csi. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: virtio - bound the akcipher result length
virtio_crypto_dataq_akcipher_callback() sets the result length from the
device-reported response length without bounding it to the destination
buffer, which was allocated for the original request length.
sg_copy_from_buffer() then reads that many bytes from the destination
buffer; a backend reporting a larger length over-reads adjacent kernel
heap into the caller's scatterlist (an out-of-bounds read).
Clamp the reported length to the originally requested destination length.
A conforming device reports no more than that, so valid results are
unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets
The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit
offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport
header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received
multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable.
If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header()
truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header.
The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as
a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized
multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data.
Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to
skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final
head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in
batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before
setting the network header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation
End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.
The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.
The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.
Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.
Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
Write of size 255
The relevant End.DX4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dx4_finish
input_action_end_dx4
The relevant End.DT4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dt4
tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.
When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.
Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress. |
