| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A heap-based out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s handling of malformed image soft-mask data. Insufficient validation of the soft-mask data attribute during image parsing may cause an arithmetic underflow, resulting in an out-of-bounds read and application crash. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s handling of PDF form fields. Embedded JavaScript may access form-field references after the corresponding fields have been released, resulting in an application crash. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s PDF page-tree handling. A specially crafted PDF can trigger page-structure changes during rendering, causing the application to access released page objects and resulting in memory corruption and an application crash. |
| A heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s rendering of Circle annotations with malformed Cloudy appearance streams in specially crafted PDF files. Insufficient validation of the appearance geometry can result in memory corruption and application crashes. |
| A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the updater of Foxit PDF Editor/Reader due to unsafe loading of dynamic-link libraries from a user-writable directory during high-privilege operations. A local attacker could exploit this issue to execute code with elevated privileges. |
| A heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s WebP image decoding due to improper handling of bitmap stride and target buffer formats. Successful exploitation could result in an application crash. |
| A path traversal vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader's handling of embedded PDF resources. Insufficient validation of resource file paths may allow files to be written outside their intended locations, potentially enabling arbitrary code execution. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s handling of JavaScript array objects. A specially crafted PDF may cause the application to access a released object during array processing, potentially resulting in application crashes or arbitrary code execution. |
| The interface of Foxit PDF Editor/Reader lacks the permission verification for secure reading mode, which allows specially crafted PDFs to trigger external SMB authentication without any security prompts and thereby leak the hash of the user's credentials. |
| Foxit PDF Editor/Reader's FileOpen plugin did not adequately validate certain encryption metadata in specially crafted PDF files. This could leave an internal pointer in an invalid state, resulting in chained read and write access violations and potentially enabling arbitrary code execution. |
| An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the PDF rendering process of Foxit PDF Editor/Reader due to insufficient consistency and boundary validation when processing malformed color space data, which may cause the program to crash and potentially lead to remote code execution. |
| When opening a specially crafted PDF, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader executes scripts that modify annotation rich-text attributes containing malformed font data. During subsequent annotation appearance reconstruction, it accesses an object after it has been released, resulting in a use-after-free condition and an application crash. |
| When processing a specially crafted PDF, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader may perform reentrant zoom and layout operations through page- and annotation-related JavaScript actions. This can cause the application to access page objects after they have been released, resulting in a use-after-free condition and an application crash. |
| When processing a specially crafted PDF file, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader may encounter a reentrant execution condition involving JavaScript triggered by page-visibility events. This can cause the application to access a released page-view object while calculating annotation boundaries, resulting in an invalid memory read and application crash. |
| When rendering the page image, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader fails to perform validation on image objects whose optional content attributes are malformed. As a result, the program may access an already-freed internal data structure, triggering a crash due to UAF. |
| Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s U3D/GIF texture decoding path contained insufficient validation of image dimensions and related size information. Under certain conditions, this could lead to an incorrectly sized memory allocation and a subsequent out-of-bounds write during pixel processing, potentially resulting in remote code execution. |
| When implementing the JavaScript interface, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader did not perform the attribute authorization checks required by the specification. As a result, a trusted malicious PDF could potentially access sensitive content from other documents within the same process and transmit it externally. |
| Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure. |
| TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID. |
| UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does not cover this path because the accumulation bypasses ReadConstrainedTextBuffer. The reporter measured a 20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character malformed token on the DataInput path, against 367 characters for identical input on the InputStream path. Scaling the payload drives the StringBuilder, which also incurs byte-to-char expansion and internal array doubling, to many times the raw payload size and can trigger OutOfMemoryError for the whole JVM. UTF8DataInputJsonParser was introduced in 2.8.0 together with createParser(DataInput); releases before 2.8.0 do not contain the affected class. |
