| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
OPP: add index check to assert to avoid buffer overflow in _read_freq()
Pass the freq index to the assert function to make sure
we do not read a freq out of the opp->rates[] table when called
from the indexed variants:
dev_pm_opp_find_freq_exact_indexed() or
dev_pm_opp_find_freq_ceil/floor_indexed().
Add a secondary parameter to the assert function, unused
for assert_single_clk() then add assert_clk_index() which
will check for the clock index when called from the _indexed()
find functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad7923: Fix buffer overflow for tx_buf and ring_xfer
The AD7923 was updated to support devices with 8 channels, but the size
of tx_buf and ring_xfer was not increased accordingly, leading to a
potential buffer overflow in ad7923_update_scan_mode(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Fix overflow in oa batch buffer
By default xe_bb_create_job() appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END to batch
buffer, this is not a problem if batch buffer is only used once but
oa reuses the batch buffer for the same metric and at each call
it appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END, printing the warning below and then
overflowing.
[ 381.072016] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 381.072019] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] Assertion `bb->len * 4 + bb_prefetch(q->gt) <= size` failed!
platform: LUNARLAKE subplatform: 1
graphics: Xe2_LPG / Xe2_HPG 20.04 step B0
media: Xe2_LPM / Xe2_HPM 20.00 step B0
tile: 0 VRAM 0 B
GT: 0 type 1
So here checking if batch buffer already have MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END if
not append it.
v2:
- simply fix, suggestion from Ashutosh
(cherry picked from commit 9ba0e0f30ca42a98af3689460063edfb6315718a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies
mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed
MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without
checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback
can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the
reply.
Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial
replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized
reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of
overwriting st->buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf
iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into
login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer
allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call
sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check
the remaining buffer capacity:
*length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
*length += 1;
output_buf = textbuf + *length;
The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the
*input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal
four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte
"a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response().
2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB
heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.
The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses
snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer,
and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through
iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in
iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and
iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls
iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1;
both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR /
ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning,
so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a
silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL
caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same
shape.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight
bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device
report a smaller size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: fs210x: fix possible buffer overflow
In fs210x_effect_scene_info(), a string was copied like this:
strscpy(DST, SRC, strlen(SRC) + 1);
A buffer overflow would happen if strlen(SRC) >= sizeof(DST).
Actually, strscpy() must be used this way:
strscpy(DST, SRC, sizeof(DST));
strscpy(DST, SRC); // defaults to sizeof(DST) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer
adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:
memcpy(data_r, &msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);
The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record's worth of bytes. adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data->dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes. A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call
if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
return -EIO;
can reject the response.
Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper's maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot. |
| A vulnerability was found in the pkcs15-init tool in OpenSC. An attacker could use a crafted USB Device or Smart Card, which would present the system with a specially crafted response to APDUs. When buffers are partially filled with data, initialized parts of the buffer can be incorrectly accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as
a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer
contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte
buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header
fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a
remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len
against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed
integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after
skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.3 and iPadOS 18.3, iPadOS 17.7.6, macOS Sequoia 15.3, macOS Sonoma 14.7.5, macOS Ventura 13.7.5, tvOS 18.3, visionOS 2.3. An attacker on the local network may be able to cause a denial-of-service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()
target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a
256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that
buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which
can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN
names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only
guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will
read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs
reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()
will be triggered.
Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length
check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the
target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so
resolve that here. |
| An issue was discovered in Moxa NPort 5110 versions prior to 2.6, NPort 5130/5150 Series versions prior to 3.6, NPort 5200 Series versions prior to 2.8, NPort 5400 Series versions prior to 3.11, NPort 5600 Series versions prior to 3.7, NPort 5100A Series & NPort P5150A versions prior to 1.3, NPort 5200A Series versions prior to 1.3, NPort 5150AI-M12 Series versions prior to 1.2, NPort 5250AI-M12 Series versions prior to 1.2, NPort 5450AI-M12 Series versions prior to 1.2, NPort 5600-8-DT Series versions prior to 2.4, NPort 5600-8-DTL Series versions prior to 2.4, NPort 6x50 Series versions prior to 1.13.11, NPort IA5450A versions prior to v1.4. Buffer overflow vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()
A malicious USB device claiming to be a CDC Phonet modem can overflow
the skb_shared_info->frags[] array by sending an unbounded sequence of
full-page bulk transfers.
Drop the skb and increment the length error when the frag limit is
reached. This matches the same fix that commit f0813bcd2d9d ("net:
wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") did for the
t7xx driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests
When a compound request consists of QUERY_DIRECTORY + QUERY_INFO
(FILE_ALL_INFORMATION) and the first command consumes nearly the entire
max_trans_size, get_file_all_info() would blindly call smbConvertToUTF16()
with PATH_MAX, causing out-of-bounds write beyond the response buffer.
In get_file_all_info(), there was a missing validation check for
the client-provided OutputBufferLength before copying the filename into
FileName field of the smb2_file_all_info structure.
If the filename length exceeds the available buffer space, it could lead to
potential buffer overflows or memory corruption during smbConvertToUTF16
conversion. This calculating the actual free buffer size using
smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() and returning -EINVAL if the buffer is
insufficient and updating smbConvertToUTF16 to use the actual filename
length (clamped by PATH_MAX) to ensure a safe copy operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-adc161s626: use DMA-safe memory for spi_read()
Add a DMA-safe buffer and use it for spi_read() instead of a stack
memory. All SPI buffers must be DMA-safe.
Since we only need up to 3 bytes, we just use a u8[] instead of __be16
and __be32 and change the conversion functions appropriately. |
| A maliciously crafted PRT file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products, can force a Memory Corruption vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load
Load Long Term Keys stores the user-provided enc_size and later uses
it to size fixed-size stack operations when replying to LE LTK
requests. An enc_size larger than the 16-byte key buffer can therefore
overflow the reply stack buffer.
Reject oversized enc_size values while validating the management LTK
record so invalid keys never reach the stored key state. |
| A flaw was found in Open vSwitch. When Open vSwitch is configured with a conntrack flow using FTP helpers over the userspace datapath, a remote attacker can send a specially crafted FTP stream with an EPASV command exceeding 255 characters. This heap access error can lead to a crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected system. |
