| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix adv monitor add failure cleanup
hci_add_adv_monitor() publishes a new adv_monitor in
hdev->adv_monitors_idr before the powered MSFT setup step. The MSFT
offload add path can then fail either locally before the controller add
command completes, or in the MSFT add callback. In the current queued
management add flow, hci_cmd_sync_work() still invokes
mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete() with the original pending command
after msft_add_monitor_pattern() returns.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
MSFT add handling MGMT completion
1. insert monitor and handle 1. receive sync error
2. send MSFT add command 2. call add-monitor completion
3. callback sees bad response 3. load cmd->user_data
4. callback frees monitor 4. read monitor->handle
Local MSFT setup failures have the other half of the same ownership bug:
they return an error after the IDR insertion, but no later code removes the
failed monitor from the IDR.
Keep ownership with the pending management command until its completion.
For normal management adds, the MSFT add callback now records successful
controller state and returns errors to its caller. The management
completion frees the monitor on non-success after copying the response
handle, while resume/reregister callback-error cleanup remains in the
MSFT callback. The success path keeps the existing bookkeeping.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0xfb/0x260 [bluetooth]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x5f0
? mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0xfb/0x260 [bluetooth]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
? mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0xfb/0x260 [bluetooth]
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0xfb/0x260 [bluetooth]
mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0xfb/0x260 [bluetooth]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? 0xffffffffc00d00da
? __pfx_mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]
? __pfx_mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1ab/0x210 [bluetooth]
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1c0/0x210 [bluetooth]
? __pfx_mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0
? __pfx_hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 471 on cpu 3 at 285.205389s:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
add_adv_patterns_monitor_rssi+0xd5/0x230 [bluetooth]
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth]
__sys_sendto+0x2bc/0x2d0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 454 on cpu 2 at 285.217112s:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x313/0x590
msft_add_monitor_sync+0x54a/0x570 [bluetooth]
hci_add_adv_monitor+0x133/0x180 [bluetooth]
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x187/0x210 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: avoid untracked enable work
lowpan_enable_set() allocates a temporary work item and schedules
do_enable_set() on system_wq, then returns to debugfs. The debugfs active
operation has ended at that point, but the worker still executes module
text and manipulates enable_6lowpan and listen_chan.
bt_6lowpan_exit() removes the debugfs files and immediately closes and
puts listen_chan. It has no pointer to the queued work item, so it cannot
cancel or flush it before tearing down the state that the worker uses.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
debugfs enable write module exit
1. lowpan_enable_set() allocates 1. bt_6lowpan_exit() removes
set_enable work the debugfs file
2. schedule_work() queues 2. bt_6lowpan_exit() closes
do_enable_set() and puts listen_chan
3. the write operation returns 3. module teardown can continue
4. do_enable_set() later runs
against stale state
Run the enable state transition synchronously in lowpan_enable_set()
instead. The simple debugfs setter can sleep, and this file already handles
the 6LoWPAN control write synchronously under the same set_lock. Once the
setter returns, debugfs removal covers the whole operation and exit can no
longer race with an untracked work item.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_enable_set+0x113/0x2e0
Workqueue: events do_enable_set [bluetooth_6lowpan]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888109cb8000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block
The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked
independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are
backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and
command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL
register and moves data through the shared cache registers.
Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The
per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a
different lock.
The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of
the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs
decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache
read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule
write to another Super VCAP instance.
Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache
between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer
commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.
Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule
lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the
per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that
serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new
admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the
control lock instead of a per-instance one.
No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a
single mutex cannot self-deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in
hv_vhca->agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an
asynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before
returning to mlx5e.
The asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent's invalidate
callback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the
command to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_agent.work), or
- call queue_delayed_work(priv->wq, &sagent->work, sagent->delay).
However, the delayed_work and priv->stats_agent.agent are only
initialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:
agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */
...
priv->stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */
If the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments
above, it can:
- Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is
NULL. queue_delayed_work() calls add_timer() unconditionally, so
when the timer expires the timer softirq invokes a NULL function
pointer.
- Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while
the timer is already enqueued in the timer wheel, corrupting the
hlist (entry.pprev cleared while the previous bucket node still
points at this entry).
- When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads
sagent->agent (NULL) and dereferences it inside
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_write().
Fix this by:
- Initializing priv->stats_agent.work before invoking
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(), so the work is always in a valid
state when the control callback observes it.
- Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent **ctx_update out-parameter
to mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper writes the agent
pointer to *ctx_update before publishing into hv_vhca->agents[]
and triggering the agents_update flow, so any callback
subsequently invoked from that flow already sees a valid
priv->stats_agent.agent. This avoids having the control
callback participate in agent initialization.
While at it, access priv->stats_agent.agent with
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and
clear priv->stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: avoid stale runlist element dereference in fallocate
ntfs_attr_fallocate() allocates holes and delayed allocations inside
initialized size by looking up the current runlist element under
ni->runlist.lock. The returned struct runlist_element is only a borrowed
pointer into ni->runlist.rl. A writer can replace and free that array
after the read lock is dropped, so later reads of rl->lcn, rl->length and
rl->vcn can touch freed memory.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
ntfs_attr_fallocate():
1. Take ni->runlist.lock for read.
2. Get rl from ntfs_attr_find_vcn_nolock().
3. Drop ni->runlist.lock.
4. Read rl->lcn, rl->length and rl->vcn.
mmap page_mkwrite:
1. Enter ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite().
2. Reach __ntfs_write_iomap_begin() and ntfs_attr_map_cluster().
3. Merge allocation state with ntfs_runlists_merge().
4. Reallocate ni->runlist.rl in ntfs_rl_realloc(), freeing the old array.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_attr_fallocate+0xbb8/0xd00
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? ntfs_attr_fallocate+0xbb8/0xd00
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
? ntfs_attr_fallocate+0xbb8/0xd00
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? ntfs_attr_fallocate+0xbb8/0xd00
ntfs_attr_fallocate+0xbb8/0xd00
? lock_acquire+0x2b8/0x2f0
? __pfx_ntfs_attr_fallocate+0x10/0x10
? 0xffffffffc0000095
? down_write+0x10d/0x1e0
ntfs_fallocate+0x5c9/0x1d00
? __pfx_ntfs_fallocate+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_acquire+0x2b8/0x2f0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? selinux_file_permission+0x3a7/0x510
vfs_fallocate+0x29d/0xd30
__x64_sys_fallocate+0xc7/0x150
? do_syscall_64+0x81/0x6a0
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Allocated by task 410:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x353/0x920
ntfs_rl_realloc+0x3f/0x110
ntfs_runlists_merge+0xaa3/0x3010
ntfs_attr_map_cluster+0x4e5/0xf80
ntfs_attr_fallocate+0x53f/0xd00
ntfs_fallocate+0x5c9/0x1d00
vfs_fallocate+0x29d/0xd30
__x64_sys_fallocate+0xc7/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 424:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x307/0x580
ntfs_rl_realloc+0x6f/0x110
ntfs_runlists_merge+0x7b1/0x3010
ntfs_attr_map_cluster+0x4e5/0xf80
__ntfs_write_iomap_begin+0x8cd/0x2280
iomap_iter+0x6de/0x11e0
iomap_page_mkwrite+0x391/0x650
ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite+0x1ac/0x400
do_page_mkwrite+0x15c/0x280
__handle_mm_fault+0xd6d/0x1ca0
handle_mm_fault+0x19c/0x470
do_user_addr_fault+0x23b/0x9c0
exc_page_fault+0x5c/0xc0
asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
Fix this by copying the needed runlist fields while the read lock is still
held and using only those scalar snapshots after unlocking.
After the snapshot, ntfs_attr_map_cluster() can also find that the range
is already mapped and return balloc=false. Only call ntfs_dio_zero_range()
when new clusters were allocated, matching the write iomap path and
preserving the zero-newly-allocated-holes behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: avoid stale runlist element dereference in MFT writeback
ntfs_write_mft_block() maps each $MFT record through the $MFT data
runlist. For sub-folio clusters it looks up a struct runlist_element under
ni->runlist.lock, drops the lock, and later uses rl->length and rl->vcn
when choosing folio_sz.
That pointer is only borrowed from ni->runlist.rl. Concurrent $MFT
allocation extension can merge a replacement runlist under the same lock,
and ntfs_rl_realloc() can free the old backing array. If that happens
between the lookup and the later folio_sz decision, writeback can
dereference freed runlist storage.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
MFT writeback path: $MFT allocation extension:
1. Look up rl under 1. Extend the $MFT data allocation.
ni->runlist.lock. 2. Publish a replacement runlist.
2. Drop ni->runlist.lock. 3. Free the old runlist array.
3. Read rl->length and rl->vcn
to choose folio_sz.
Compute the remaining run length while ni->runlist.lock is still held, and
use that scalar after unlock. This preserves the existing folio sizing
decision without carrying a borrowed runlist_element across the lock
boundary.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_mft_writepages+0x1c8d/0x1fb0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? ntfs_mft_writepages+0x1c8d/0x1fb0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
? ntfs_mft_writepages+0x1c8d/0x1fb0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? ntfs_mft_writepages+0x1c8d/0x1fb0
ntfs_mft_writepages+0x1c8d/0x1fb0
? __pfx_ntfs_mft_writepages+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? iput+0x92/0xa80
do_writepages+0x219/0x530
? __pfx_do_writepages+0x10/0x10
__writeback_single_inode+0x117/0xf50
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x270
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___writeback_single_inode+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
writeback_sb_inodes+0x65b/0x1810
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_acquire+0x2b8/0x2f0
? __pfx_writeback_sb_inodes+0x10/0x10
? lock_release+0x1e0/0x280
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? move_expired_inodes+0x2b8/0x850
__writeback_inodes_wb+0xf4/0x270
? __pfx___writeback_inodes_wb+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? queue_io+0x2e4/0x410
wb_writeback+0x666/0x880
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? get_nr_dirty_inodes+0x1c/0x170
wb_workfn+0x75e/0xbb0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x60
? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_debug_object_deactivate+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquire+0x2b8/0x2f0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0x1e0/0x280
process_one_work+0x8d0/0x1870
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x575/0xf80
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2e7/0x3c0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x576/0x810
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x57e/0xe10
? __switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 970:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x353/0x920
ntfs_rl_realloc+0x3c/0x80
ntfs_runlists_merge+0x1212/0x3010
ntfs_mft_data_extend_allocation_nolock+0x3e0/0x1f40
ntfs_mft_record_alloc+0x1ab4/0x4f10
__ntfs_create+0x680/0x2e50
ntfs_create+0x1e6/0x3a0
path_openat+0x2b55/0x3c10
do_file_open+0x1f4/0x460
do_sys_openat2+0xde/0x170
__x64_sys_openat+0x122/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 1294:
kasan_save_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
minix: avoid overflow in bitmap block count calculation
minix_check_superblock() uses minix_blocks_needed() to verify that the
on-disk imap and zmap block counts are large enough for the advertised
inode and zone counts.
The helper currently performs DIV_ROUND_UP() in unsigned int arithmetic.
A Minix v3 image can set s_ninodes or s_zones near UINT_MAX so the
addition inside DIV_ROUND_UP() wraps to zero. That makes a zero imap/zmap
block count look valid, after which minix_fill_super() can dereference
s_imap[0] or s_zmap[0] even though no bitmap buffers were allocated.
Impact: mounting a crafted Minix v3 image whose s_ninodes or s_zones is
near UINT_MAX makes minix_check_superblock() accept a zero bitmap-block
count and minix_fill_super() dereference s_imap[0]/s_zmap[0], panicking
the kernel.
The divisor is the bitmap capacity in bits, blocksize * 8, which is
always a power of two: minix_fill_super() obtains the block size through
sb_set_blocksize(), and blk_validate_block_size() rejects any size that
is not a power of two. Use DIV_ROUND_UP_POW2(), which divides before
adding the round-up term and so cannot overflow for a power-of-two
divisor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/ts4800: Fix missing chained handler cleanup on remove
The driver installs a chained handler for the parent interrupt during probe
using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(), but the remove function does not
clear this handler. This leaves a dangling handler that may be called when
the parent interrupt fires after the driver has been removed, potentially
accessing freed memory and causing a kernel crash.
Additionally, the parent_irq obtained via irq_of_parse_and_map() is not
stored, making it inaccessible in the remove function. Moreover, interrupt
mappings created during probe are not properly disposed.
Fix this by:
- Saving parent_irq in probe
- Clearing the chained handler with NULL in ts4800_ic_remove()
- Disposing all IRQ mappings before domain removal to prevent resource
leaks |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: stp: Fix a potential use-after-free when deleting a bridge
The three STP timers are not supposed to be armed while the bridge is
administratively down. They are synchronously deactivated when the
bridge is put administratively down and the various call sites check for
'IFF_UP' before arming them.
This check is missing from br_topology_change_detection() and it is
possible to engineer a situation in which the topology change timer is
armed while the bridge is administratively down, resulting in a
use-after-free [1] when the bridge is deleted.
Fix by adding the missing check and for good measures synchronously
shutdown the three timers when the bridge is deleted.
[1]
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88811662b9b0 object type: timer_list hint: br_topology_change_timer_expired (net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:120)
WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1bc/0x450, CPU#9: ip/359 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_teql: Introduce slaves_lock to avoid race condition and UAF
The teql master->slaves singly linked list is not protected against
multiple writes. It can be mod'ed concurently from teql_master_xmit(),
teql_dequeue(), teql_init() and teql_destroy() without holding any list
lock or RCU protection.
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com has demonstrated that the qdisc is freed
after an RCU grace period, but teql_master_xmit() running on another
CPU can still hold a stale pointer into the list, resulting in a
slab-use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in teql_master_xmit+0xf0f/0x16b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013fb0440 by task poc/332
Freed 512-byte region [ffff888013fb0400, ffff888013fb0600) (kmalloc-512)
The fix?
Add a per-master slaves_lock spinlock that serializes all mutations of
master->slaves and the NEXT_SLAVE() links in teql_destroy() and
teql_qdisc_init(). teql_master_xmit() also takes the same slaves_lock
around those updates.
Annotate master->slaves and the per-slave ->next pointer with __rcu and
use the appropriate RCU accessors everywhere they are touched:
rcu_assign_pointer() on the writer side (under slaves_lock),
rcu_dereference_protected() for the writer-side loads (also under
slaves_lock), rcu_dereference_bh() for the loads in teql_master_xmit() and
rtnl_dereference() for the loads in teql_master_open()/teql_master_mtu(),
which run under RTNL.
Pair this with rcu_read_lock_bh()/rcu_read_unlock_bh() around the list
traversal in teql_master_xmit(), so that readers either observe a fully
linked list or are deferred until the in-flight mutation completes. The two
early-return paths in teql_master_xmit() are updated to release the RCU-bh
read-side critical section before returning, since leaving it held would
disable BH on that CPU for good. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: don't cache shinfo across skb realloc
fbnic_tx_lso() calls skb_cow_head() which may reallocate the skb
including the shared info. We can't use the pointer calculated
before the call.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fbnic_tx_lso.isra.0+0x668/0x8e0
Read of size 4 at addr ff110000262edd98 by task swapper/5/0
Call Trace:
fbnic_tx_lso.isra.0+0x668/0x8e0
fbnic_xmit_frame+0x622/0xba0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x620
Allocated by task 8653:
__alloc_skb+0x11e/0x5f0
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xcc/0x6c0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x327/0x3f0
__ip_append_data+0x188b/0x47a0
ip_make_skb+0x24a/0x300
udp_sendmsg+0x14d2/0x21e0
Freed by task 0:
kfree+0x123/0x5a0
pskb_expand_head+0x36c/0xfa0
fbnic_tx_lso.isra.0+0x500/0x8e0
fbnic_xmit_frame+0x622/0xba0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x620
sch_direct_xmit+0x25b/0x1100
The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110000262edc40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 344 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ff110000262edc40, ff110000262ede |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
alloc_tag: fix use-after-free in /proc/allocinfo after module unload
allocinfo_start() only reinitializes the codetag iterator at position 0.
For subsequent reads (position > 0), it reuses cached iterator state from
the previous batch. allocinfo_stop() drops mod_lock between read batches,
which allows module unload to complete and free the module memory that the
cached iterator still references:
CPU0 (read) CPU1 (rmmod)
---- ----
allocinfo_start(pos=0)
down_read(mod_lock)
allocinfo_show()
...
allocinfo_stop()
up_read(mod_lock)
codetag_unload_module()
kfree(cmod)
release_module_tags()
...
free_mod_mem()
allocinfo_start(pos=N)
down_read(mod_lock)
// reuses cached iter, skips re-init
allocinfo_show()
ct->filename <-- UAF
After free_mod_mem() frees the module's .rodata, allocinfo_show()
dereferences ct->filename, ct->function which point there.
Save the iterator state in allocinfo_next() and resume from it in
allocinfo_start() with codetag_next_ct(), which detects module removal via
idr_find() returning NULL and skips to the next module. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_dup_netdev: add nf_dev_xmit_recursion*() helpers and use them
Update nft_dup and nft_fwd to use the nf_dev_xmit_recursion() helpers.
This patch also disables BH when transmitting the skb to address a
possible migration to different CPU leading to imbalanced decrementation
of the recursion counters.
This is modeled after Florian Westphal's dev_xmit_recursion*() API
available since commit 97cdcf37b57e ("net: place xmit recursion in
softnet data") according to its current state in the tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Kill MIDI 2.0 URBs before freeing endpoints
MIDI 2.0 input URBs are started during snd_usb_midi_v2_create(). A
later setup failure can still jump to snd_usb_midi_v2_free(), which
currently frees each endpoint and its coherent URB buffers without first
stopping the submitted URBs. A completion can then dereference the
embedded URB context and endpoint state after they have been freed, or
try to resubmit from the stale endpoint.
This was observed as a KASAN slab-use-after-free in
input_urb_complete().
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
probe error path: USB completion path:
1. start_input_streams() submits 1. The HCD still owns a
input URBs. submitted input URB.
2. A later setup helper returns 2. input_urb_complete() runs
an error. with urb->context in ep.
3. snd_usb_midi_v2_free() frees 3. The completion reads ep
endpoint storage and URB buffers. state and can requeue URBs.
Make the endpoint destructor follow the same teardown ordering used for
disconnect when the endpoint has not already been disconnected: publish
ep->disconnected, kill the URBs synchronously, and drain the endpoint
before freeing URB buffers and endpoint storage. The guard avoids
repeating the stop sequence after the normal
snd_usb_midi_v2_disconnect_all() path, while still synchronizing the
direct MIDI 2.0 create-error free path.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in input_urb_complete+0x37/0x1b0
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2e/0x50
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
print_report+0xce/0x5f0
input_urb_complete+0x37/0x1b0 (sound/usb/midi2.c:186)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x112/0x1d0
dummy_timer+0xaaa/0x19a0
lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
__lock_acquire+0x467/0x28b0
mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xbb/0x1a0
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x101/0x520
hrtimer_run_softirq+0xd0/0x130
handle_softirqs+0x15b/0x670
__irq_exit_rcu+0xd0/0x170
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
xfrm async resumption hold skb->dev refcnt until after transport_finish.
However, xfrm_rcv_cb may modify skb->dev to tunnel dev without taking
device reference, such as vti_rcv_cb. The subsequent async resumption
will decrement the tunnel device's reference count, which lead to uaf
of tunnel dev and refcnt leak of orig dev as below:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vti1 to become free. Usage count = -2
Stash the original skb->dev to fix refcnt imbalance. The new skb->dev set
by xfrm_rcv_cb can race with device teardown. Extend rcu protection over
xfrm_rcv_cb and transport_finish to prevent races. |
| IBM AIX 7.2, and 7.3 and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1 has a pointer validation flaw exists in the AIX Virtual SCSI (vSCSI) initiator driver. Successful exploitation may result in denial of service, privilege escalation, or full compromise of the client LPAR kernel. |
| IBM AIX 7.2, and 7.3 and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1 could allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper validation of an attacker-controlled pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: fix order of kfree_rcu() and rcu_assign_pointer()
Sashiko pointed out that kfree_rcu() was called before
rcu_assign_pointer() in handling the comment extension.
Fix the order so that rcu_assign_pointer() called first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()
KMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user():
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _inline_copy_to_user
include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120
lib/usercopy.c:26
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120 lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x2e7/0x440 net/socket.c:302
____sys_recvmsg+0x232/0x610 net/socket.c:2925
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ieee802154_addr_to_sa include/net/ieee802154_netdev.h:369 [inline]
dgram_recvmsg+0xa09/0xbe0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:739
The issue occurs because the `pan_id` field of `struct ieee802154_addr`
is left uninitialized when the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.
The execution flow is as follows:
1. `__ieee802154_rx_handle_packet()` declares a local `struct
ieee802154_hdr hdr` on the stack.
2. `ieee802154_hdr_pull()` calls `ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` to parse
the source and destination addresses into this structure.
3. If the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`,
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` previously only set the `mode` field,
leaving the `pan_id` field containing uninitialized stack memory.
4. This uninitialized `pan_id` is later copied into a `struct
sockaddr_ieee802154` in `dgram_recvmsg()` via `ieee802154_addr_to_sa()`.
5. Finally, `move_addr_to_user()` copies the socket address structure to
user space, leaking the uninitialized bytes.
Fix this by using `memset` to zero out the address structure in
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` when the mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: hold socket lock when dumping endpoints in sctp_diag
SCTP_DIAG endpoint dumping was traversing endpoint address lists without
holding lock_sock(), while those lists could change concurrently via
socket operations (e.g., bindx changes). This creates a race where
nla_reserve() counts addresses under RCU protection, but the subsequent
copy may see fewer entries, potentially leaking uninitialized memory to
userspace.
Fix this by:
- Taking a reference on each endpoint during hash traversal
- Moving socket operations (lock_sock()) outside read_lock_bh()
- Serializing address list access during dump
- Reworking sctp_for_each_endpoint() to support restart-based traversal
with (net, pos) tracking
Also:
- Add WARN_ON_ONCE() for inconsistent address counts
- Fix idiag_states filtering for LISTEN vs association cases
- Skip dumping endpoints being freed (ep->base.dead)
- Move dump position tracking into iterator, removing cb->args[4] and
its comment for sctp_ep_dump().,
- Update the comment for cb->args[4] and remove the comment for unused
cb->args[5] for sctp_sock_dump().
Note: traversal is restart-based and may re-scan buckets multiple times,
but this is acceptable due to small bucket sizes and required to support
sleeping-safe callbacks.
This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero
Day Initiative. |
