| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: dvm: fix memory leak in iwl_op_mode_dvm_start()
In iwl_op_mode_dvm_start(), jumping to out_free_eeprom currently bypasses
the out_free_eeprom_blob label. Consequently, error paths triggered after
successfully parsing the EEPROM free priv->nvm_data but leak
priv->eeprom_blob.
Fix this memory leak by reordering the error handling labels so
that out_free_eeprom falls through to out_free_eeprom_blob.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc6.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have
supported Intel DVM wireless hardware and firmware to test with, no
runtime testing was able to be performed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix use-after-free from rx_urb_wq on stop
rtl8xxxu arms rx_urb_wq from the RX completion path:
rtl8xxxu_rx_complete() hands the URB to rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(), which
queues it on rx_urb_pending_list and, once the list grows past
RTL8XXXU_RX_URB_PENDING_WATER, schedules rx_urb_wq. The worker
rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() drains rx_urb_pending_list, recovers priv through
container_of, and resubmits each URB through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(),
which anchors it on rx_anchor and dereferences priv->udev.
rtl8xxxu_stop() cancels the sibling work items (c2hcmd_work, ra_watchdog,
update_beacon_work) but never cancels rx_urb_wq, so a worker armed during
the last burst of RX traffic can run rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() after
rtl8xxxu_disconnect() has called ieee80211_free_hw(), which frees priv,
producing a use-after-free. The window opens under active RX traffic
(pending count above the watermark) followed by a disconnect.
There are two teardown races to close:
* rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb() decided whether to enqueue under rx_urb_lock
but called schedule_work() after dropping the lock. A completion
that observed shutdown == false and released the lock could then call
schedule_work() after rtl8xxxu_stop() had set shutdown and
cancel_work_sync() had already returned, arming the worker to run
after the teardown. Move schedule_work() under the same !shutdown
branch so the arming decision is atomic with the shutdown check.
* rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() anchors every URB it drained back onto
rx_anchor through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(). A worker still running
when usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_anchor) returned would submit a
URB that escaped the kill. In rtl8xxxu_stop(), call
cancel_work_sync(&priv->rx_urb_wq) before the kill so the worker is
drained first.
After priv->shutdown is set under rx_urb_lock, completions can no longer
queue rx_urb_wq. cancel_work_sync() then drains the last queued or running
worker, and the following usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the URBs it may
have submitted.
rtl8xxxu_disconnect() is covered because ieee80211_unregister_hw()
guarantees .stop() runs for a live interface before ieee80211_free_hw()
frees priv. The probe error path needs no cancel: rx_urb_wq is
INIT_WORK()'d there but cannot have been scheduled, since no URB is
submitted before ieee80211_register_hw() succeeds.
This bug was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy
mt7915_mcu_get_eeprom() copies a fixed EFUSE block into the driver's
dev->mt76.eeprom.data buffer at the offset reported by the MCU response
(res->addr, a device-controlled __le32) without checking it against the
buffer size. A malicious or malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary
address and drive a 16-byte out-of-bounds write past eeprom.data.
Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data
before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested
in-bounds offset are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy
mt7996_mcu_get_eeprom() derives the destination of the EFUSE/EXT block
copy from the address reported by the MCU response (event->addr, a
device-controlled __le32) and clamps only the copy length, never the
destination offset into dev->mt76.eeprom.data. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary address and drive an
out-of-bounds write of up to MT7996_EXT_EEPROM_BLOCK_SIZE bytes past
eeprom.data.
Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data
before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested
in-bounds offset are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: defer eventfd signaling when queued from a wakeup handler
io_req_local_work_add() signals the CQ ring eventfd inline when it is the
one to push the first entry onto ->work_list. For DEFER_TASKRUN rings that
add is frequently done from a waitqueue wakeup handler, where an
arbitrary waitqueue lock is held.
eventfd_signal_mask() only refuses to recurse when current->in_eventfd
is set, but that bit is set by eventfd_signal_mask() itself. If the wake
chain starts somewhere else, signal goes out inline and can feed back
into epoll.
Add IOU_F_TWQ_IN_WAKE, set it on the task_work add done from the three
waitqueue callbacks, and use it to force io_eventfd_signal() down the
existing call_rcu_hurry() deferral instead of signaling inline. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tap: fix wrong transport_header when sending VLAN-tagged frame
In tap_get_user_xdp(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame (e.g.
ETH_P_8021Q), skb_set_network_header() is called first to advance
network_header past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header.
skb_probe_transport_header() is then called with skb->protocol still
set to ETH_P_8021Q, while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset())
already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header.
In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff
points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it
reads a struct vlan_hdr at the current nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(),
but that offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header).
The bytes are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage
encapsulated EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector
returns false, so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls
skb_set_transport_header(), leaving transport_header at its uninitialized
sentinel value (~0U).
Move skb_set_network_header() to after skb_probe_transport_header(). At
the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still
points to the VLAN header (offset ETH_HLEN), so nhoff is correct and the
flow dissector can parse the VLAN header, extract the inner EtherType,
and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing transport_header
to be set correctly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: release readahead folios on iterator preparation failure
netfs_prepare_read_iterator() batches readahead folios in put_batch so that
the folio references can be dropped after the I/O iterator has been
prepared.
If rolling_buffer_load_from_ra() fails after earlier folios have been
batched, the function returns immediately and leaves those references held.
Release the batch before returning the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntb: Store original DMA address for future release
The DMA API requires that dma_free_attrs receive the exact dma_handle
originally returned by the allocation function. Do not modify it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: avoid busy looping in tipc_exit_net()
Blamed commit introduced a busy-wait loop in tipc_exit_net()
to wait for pending UDP bearer cleanup works to complete:
while (atomic_read(&tn->wq_count))
cond_resched();
This loop can busy-wait for a long time if cond_resched() is a NOP. This
typically happens if the netns exit is executed by a high priority task,
or under kernels configured without preemption (CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE). In
such cases, it wastes CPU cycles and can lead to soft lockups.
Fix this by replacing the busy loop with wait_var_event(), allowing the
thread to sleep properly until the work queue count reaches zero.
Accordingly, update cleanup_bearer() to use atomic_dec_and_test() and
wake_up_var() to wake up the waiter when the count drops to zero.
This uses the global wait queue hash table, avoiding the need to bloat
struct tipc_net with a wait_queue_head_t. The atomic_dec_and_test()
provides the necessary memory barrier to ensure the wakeup is not missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp
rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the
IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder
task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting
only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then
alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while
rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources()
also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local
unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in
rxe_receiver() (local DoS).
Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(),
as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling
only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never
resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear
qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c
completion paths.
Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS
tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS
smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that
assumption.
A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not
the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the
"default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective
advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss.
Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to
TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that
derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from
dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive
window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Wrap user-invoked calls to fb_set_var() in helper
Handle fbcon during display updates in fb_set_var_from_user(). Check
with fbcon if the mode change is possible, update hardware state and
finally update fbcon. Update all callers.
Only the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl currently does all steps. Other
mode-changes callers in sysfs and driver code are missing fbcon-related
steps.
With the new helper, ps3fb and sh_mobile_lcdcfb no longer maintain
fbcon state themselves. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: zero the sockaddr before returning it in getname
iso_sock_getname() fills a struct sockaddr_iso in place and returns its
size without clearing it first, so bytes it does not write are copied to
user space from the kernel stack. The getsockname(2) and getpeername(2)
paths both run through do_getsockname(), which hands getname() an
uninitialized sockaddr_storage on the stack and copies back up to the
number of bytes getname() returns, so the driver has to initialize every
byte it accounts for.
Two ranges are left uninitialized:
- struct sockaddr_iso is 10 bytes but only 9 are written (family,
iso_bdaddr, iso_bdaddr_type), leaking the trailing pad byte on every
call.
- for a broadcast peer (BIS_LINK or PA_LINK) the returned length grows
by sizeof(struct sockaddr_iso_bc), but only bc_sid, bc_num_bis and
bc_bis are filled; bc_bdaddr and bc_bdaddr_type, the first 7 bytes of
that structure, are never written.
An unprivileged process can open a BTPROTO_ISO socket and reach the pad
leak with getsockname(); the broadcast leak needs an established BIS/PA
connection. l2cap and rfcomm already memset their sockaddr in getname
for the same reason; do the same here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Add bounds check for CRAT subtype length
The CRAT parser validates that the subtype header fits within the image,
but does not verify that the advertised subtype length fits. A malformed
CRAT table with an oversized length field causes out-of-bounds reads when
kfd_parse_subtype() casts the header to specific subtype structures.
Add validation that sub_type_hdr + length does not exceed the image
boundary before parsing the subtype contents.
(cherry picked from commit 48e1d1e6e8798aef0312e68d8e586021b5b3cf4d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check sk_state before sk_protocol in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie
bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie accept a socket pointer
'sk' with argument type ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON. However, they access
sk->sk_protocol without validating whether 'sk' represents a full socket.
Fix this issue by checking sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN before inspecting
sk->sk_protocol in both bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie.
Since mini-sockets are never in the TCP_LISTEN state, the condition
short-circuits and prevents dereferencing fullsock-specific fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: initialize inode mapping flags for cached inodes
[BUG]
When running generic/795 with 8K block size, 4K page size, the test
always fails, triggering some ASSERT()s related to folio size:
795 (241074): drop_caches: 3
assertion failed: IS_ALIGNED(start, blocksize) && IS_ALIGNED(end + 1, blocksize), in extent_io.c:1404 (blocksize=8192 root=262 ino=258 start=16826368 end=16830463 mapping min order=0)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at extent_io.c:1404!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 241105 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G OE 7.2.0-rc5-custom+ #442 PREEMPT(full) f4bfb352566f3949f29c233ce6f735050a03b245
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:assert_folio_range.cold+0x3d/0x3f [btrfs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_read_folio+0x9e/0x170 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]
prepare_one_folio.constprop.0+0x104/0x2a0 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]
btrfs_buffered_write+0x285/0xa50 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x1aa/0x210 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]
iter_file_splice_write+0x31a/0x540
direct_splice_actor+0x53/0x170
splice_direct_to_actor+0xe9/0x240
do_splice_direct+0x76/0xb0
vfs_copy_file_range+0x1fd/0x630
__x64_sys_copy_file_range+0xf9/0x220
do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The ASSERT() itself is added by a later patch.
The crash is triggered with that new debug patch, and without this fix.
[CAUSE]
In the above case, the start 16826368 is properly 8K aligned, but the
end (16830463 + 1) is not 8K aligned.
Furthermore the mapping's minimal folio order is 0, not the expected 1
for 8K block size with 4K page size.
So this means some inodes do not have btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order()
called on it.
The missing btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() call happens for cached
inodes, through the following events:
- btrfs_create_new_inode() called for inode X
Which properly sets minimal folio order for the VFS inode.
- btrfs_update_inode() called for inode X
Which calls btrfs_delayed_update_inode() to create a delayed_node
into root->delayed_nodes xarray.
- Drop cache/memory pressure, evicting in-memory inode X
Which evicted the inode X, but delayed_node is still in
root->delayed_nodes for future reuse.
- btrfs_iget() for inode X called again
btrfs_iget()
|- btrfs_iget_locked()
| |- iget5_locked_rcu()
| Which creates a new vfs_inode for btrfs, whose mapping still
| has the minimal order as 0.
|
|- btrfs_read_locked_inode()
|- btrfs_fill_inode()
| |- btrfs_get_delayed_node()
| Which found out the previous node, and use that delayed
| node to initialize the new inode.
|
|- filled = true;
|- if (filled) goto cache_index;
Which skips the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and
btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls.
So the inode still has minimal folio order set as 0, not
the required 1.
Thus later page cache read will get a folio whose size is smaller than
block size, as the mapping has its minimal folio order set as 0 not 1,
then trigger the ASSERT().
[FIX]
Move the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and
btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls under cache_index label,
so that the mapping flags and minimal folio order is always set
no matter if we have a cached inode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: check if dml21_add_phantom_plane() is successful
Verify that the phantom plane was allocated to avoid a later
segfault.
(cherry picked from commit 5adb54abe5a8e82cbff7f8806db30a5f4924329f) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: use proper context for logging
The same as the rest of the code, get_ss_info_from_atombios() uses
calc_pll_cs->ctx->logger for logging. But calc_pll_cs->ctx is
initialized only later in calc_pll_max_vco_construct(). Therefore, any
output using DC_LOG_SYNC() leads to a NULL pointer deference in
get_ss_info_from_atombios().
According to Sashiko, the very same problem exists in
dce112_get_pix_clk_dividers() and dcn3_get_pix_clk_dividers() too.
To avoid accessing the NULL context, use clk_src->base.ctx->logger
everywhere. That context in base is initialized earlier in
dce110_clk_src_construct() and dce112_clk_src_construct(). Before
get_ss_info_from_atombios() or Sashiko's get_pix_clk_dividers functions
above are actually called. This is done by redefining DC_LOGGER to
CTX->logger.
Before:
dce110_clk_src_construct() did:
-> sets clk_src->base.ctx = ctx;
-> ss_info_from_atombios_create()
-> get_ss_info_from_atombios() <- uses calc_pll_cs->ctx # BOOM
-> calc_pll_max_vco_construct() <- sets calc_pll_cs->ctx
After:
dce110_clk_src_construct() does:
-> sets clk_src->base.ctx = ctx;
-> ss_info_from_atombios_create()
-> get_ss_info_from_atombios() <- uses clk_src->base.ctx
(cherry picked from commit 6f16fcbb0c46a87e3d9685407e906573d60104b0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: fix double free of wq, engine, and group structs
The release callbacks for wq, engine, and group devices
(idxd_conf_wq_release, idxd_conf_engine_release,
idxd_conf_group_release) each call kfree() on the enclosing struct.
The setup error paths and cleanup functions also call kfree()
explicitly after put_device(), producing a double free whenever
put_device() drops the reference count to zero and fires the release.
In the setup functions, device_initialize() is called before
device_add(), so the reference count is exactly 1 at the error sites.
put_device() unconditionally fires the release, which frees the struct;
the subsequent explicit kfree() then operates on freed memory.
For idxd_setup_wqs(), the wq release callback also owns opcap_bmap
and wqcfg. The error unwind additionally freed those fields explicitly
before calling put_device(), causing further double frees on both.
Remove the redundant explicit kfree() calls from all setup error paths
and cleanup functions for wq, engine, and group structs, delegating
sole ownership of those allocations to the release callbacks. |
