| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Capgo (capgo.app) exposes the legacy membership table public.org_users directly through Supabase PostgREST. The table's row-level security policies "Allow org admin to insert" and "Allow org admin to update" only verify that the caller has admin rights in the target organization (public.check_min_rights('admin', ...)); they do not require a pending invitation in tmp_users, acceptance of an invite token via /private/accept_invitation, any action by the target user, or the membership/role-consistency and anti-escalation checks enforced by the RBAC role-binding path. As a result, an authenticated user who is an admin of an organization can INSERT or UPDATE org_users rows directly to add any existing public.users account as an active member of that organization with user_right="admin", bypassing the invitation and role-assignment workflow entirely. In testing, an account with no prior access to the organization or its apps could, after such a direct insert, read the organization and app and pass check_min_rights. All versions are affected and no patch was available at the time of publication. |
| capgo.app through 12.129.0 fails to verify deletion status when serving cached bundle artifacts from the public file read endpoint. Unauthenticated attackers can download deleted bundles using cached URLs and trigger restoration of deleted objects into R2 storage on cache hits. |
| Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The `enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger` / `check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert` content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts `app_versions` rows whose previous `storage_provider` is `r2-direct`, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the `/updates` endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude `r2-direct` versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the `r2-direct` state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through `/updates`. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue. |
| Capgo CLI (npm package @capgo/cli) through 7.98.2 is affected by an over-permissioned service account in its Android onboarding flow. When onboarding via Google OAuth, the CLI invites the generated Google Play service account with the account-wide Play Console permission CAN_MANAGE_DRAFT_APPS_GLOBAL (passed as developerAccountPermissions in the Android Publisher API User create request), even though the user-facing flow states the service account is invited into a single confirmed app with release-only permissions. As a result, anyone who obtains the generated service account key (PLAY_CONFIG_JSON) can create, edit, and delete draft apps across the entire Google Play developer account rather than being limited to the selected package. No patched version was available at the time of publication. |
| Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is 'r2-direct', which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication. |
| Capgo (capgo.app) is affected by an authorization flaw in the app icon update path. The PUT /app/:id endpoint accepts a user-controlled `icon` value, normalizes it, and stores it in public.apps.icon_url without verifying that the image path belongs to the target app's own image namespace (e.g. org/{owner_org}/{app_id}/...). Updating apps.icon_url fires the on_app_update trigger, whose worker reads record.icon_url and calls cleanStoredImageMetadata(), which runs with service-role credentials (supabaseAdmin()) and downloads and re-uploads the referenced storage object with upsert: true. As a result, an authenticated holder of an app-limited write API key can cause the privileged worker to rewrite an out-of-scope private image object (for example an organization logo) that the key cannot read or write directly under Supabase Storage RLS. All versions are affected; no patched version was available at the time of the advisory. |
| Cap-go capgo.app fails to validate that principals in channel_permission_overrides belong to the organization, allowing authenticated app/org admins to grant channel permissions to non-member users. Attackers with admin privileges can insert override rows with arbitrary external user UUIDs to grant channel-scoped permissions such as channel.promote_bundle to users outside the organization. |
| capgo.app is an over-the-air update platform for Capacitor apps. In all versions prior to a fix, the row-level security UPDATE policy on the public.orgs table permits an organization admin (a user holding org.update_settings) to update the entire row, including the internal billing pointer column customer_id. The official organization update endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/public/organization/put.ts) allowlists only a small set of editable settings fields and excludes customer_id, and the private Stripe billing route separately requires the org.update_billing permission. By sending an update directly to Supabase PostgREST, an authenticated org admin without org.update_billing can null or corrupt the organization's Stripe customer pointer, causing plan and billing checks that trust orgs.customer_id to fail and moving the organization from a valid paid plan state to unpaid/no-plan behavior. At the time of the advisory no patched version was available. |
| Cap-go capgo.app before 12.267.1 fails to validate target API key privilege during rotation, allowing an apikey_manager to rotate a higher-privileged org_super_admin sibling key and recover its plaintext credential. Attackers with apikey_manager role can enumerate same-owner API keys, rotate a stronger sibling through the PUT endpoint, and obtain the replacement plaintext secret to authenticate as the higher-privileged principal. |
| Capgo before 12.244.1 contains a cross-tenant integrity vulnerability in the metadata-cleaning worker that trusts image object keys from mutable database rows without validating ownership. An authenticated attacker can place a victim tenant's image key in a row they control, causing the service-role worker to download and re-upload that object with sanitized metadata. Attackers can silently modify metadata in cross-tenant image objects by supplying known victim keys during authorized row updates, bypassing storage access controls through the confused-deputy metadata worker. |
| capgo.app is an over-the-air (OTA) update platform for Capacitor apps. In all versions up to and including the current release (no patch available at time of publication), the `transfer_app()` database function transfers an app, its channels, versions and related records to a destination organization without deleting or revalidating existing rows in `channel_permission_overrides`. As a result, a user who legitimately held a channel permission override while a member of the source organization retains that override after the transfer, even though they have no membership and no RBAC binding in the destination organization. Using their own authenticated JWT against the PostgREST API, such a former member can modify the destination-owned channel to point at a different bundle, causing the /updates endpoint to serve an attacker-selected application version to devices. The previously proposed fix for GHSA-626c-p6fq-3whq (PR #3093), which validates organization membership when an override is created or updated, does not remove overrides that became stale as a result of an app transfer. |
| Capgo (capgo.app) through version 12.261.0 contains an incomplete access-control fix for the public.sso_providers table. Migration 20260826100000_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql installs a BEFORE UPDATE guard (enforce_sso_provider_client_update_guard()) that freezes only the dns_verified_at, domain, status and enforce_sso columns; provider_id (as well as metadata_url and attribute_mapping) is left writable. Because the table is granted ALL to the anon and authenticated roles with no column-level restriction, and PostgreSQL row-level security policies such as allow_org_admins_update_sso_providers constrain only which row may be updated and not which columns, a user holding the org_admin tier permission org.update_settings can PATCH provider_id over PostgREST to an identity provider under their control. Since provider_id is the trust anchor binding an email domain to an authorized IdP, the attacker can then authenticate through their own IdP while asserting the org owner's email; the server-side provider match succeeds and the merge routine attaches the attacker's SSO identity to the existing owner account, nulls its password, and deletes its other identities and sessions. This results in vertical privilege escalation from org_admin to org owner/super_admin, account takeover, and lockout of the legitimate owner. Exploitation requires that the target organization has an active SSO provider configured and that the attacker already holds org_admin in that organization. No patched version is available. |
| Capgo (capgo.app backend, versions ≤ 12.261.0) improperly restricts which roles the apikey_manager organization role may bind to newly created API keys. When an authenticated user holding only apikey_manager (permissions org.manage_apikeys and org.read) calls POST /apikey with a JWT session, the only checks applied are the org.manage_apikeys permission, a fixed deny-list of assignable role names (APIKEY_MANAGER_DENIED_ASSIGNABLE_ROLES in public/apikey/scope.ts), and a priority-rank comparison in createRoleBindingForPrincipal (private/role_bindings.ts). No check verifies that the caller actually holds the permissions conferred by the role being assigned. Because the deny-list omits the deploy roles app_developer, app_uploader, channel_developer and channel_uploader, and apikey_manager is seeded with priority_rank 78 — higher than those roles' ranks (68, 66, 58, 57) — the rank check also passes. As a result, an apikey_manager who cannot upload bundles or promote channels can mint an API key bound to a deploy role and use it to push arbitrary OTA JavaScript updates to all end users of the organization's apps. As of the advisory publication no patched version was available. |
| Flowise through 3.1.4 exposes GET /api/v1/upsert-history/:id and PATCH /api/v1/upsert-history without route-level permission checks, and the backing service performs no workspace or ownership validation. getAllUpsertHistory() returns UpsertHistory rows selected solely by an attacker-supplied chatflowid, and patchDeleteUpsertHistory() deletes rows by an attacker-supplied array of record UUIDs. As a result, any authenticated low-privilege user or valid API key can read or delete document-store upsert history belonging to other users and other workspaces whenever the target chatflowId (which is exposed publicly in /chatbot/<chatflowId> share links) or row ids are known. The retrievable flowData and result fields contain embedding, record-manager and vector-store node configuration, including per-node paramValues. No patched version is available. |
| Flowise (npm packages `flowise` and `flowise-components`) through 3.1.4 looks up credentials by ID without filtering on the requesting user's workspace (findOneBy({ id: credentialId }) with no workspaceId condition) in several code paths: getAllOpenaiAssistants/getSingleOpenaiAssistant (GET /api/v1/openai-assistants and /api/v1/openai-assistants/:id), uploadFilesToAssistant (POST /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/upload/), deleteAssistant (DELETE /api/v1/assistants/:id, reachable by first importing a poisoned assistant row via POST /api/v1/export-import/import), and the shared helper used by getVoices (GET /api/v1/text-to-speech/voices). An authenticated user of one workspace can supply a credential UUID belonging to another workspace, causing the server to decrypt and use that workspace's OpenAI or ElevenLabs API key on the attacker's behalf. No patched version was available at the time of publication. |
| Flowise through 3.1.4 does not enforce authorization on the BullMQ admin dashboard. When the server runs in queue mode with the dashboard enabled and not in cloud mode (MODE=queue, ENABLE_BULLMQ_DASHBOARD=true, and !isCloud()), the /admin/queues mount is protected only by the verifyTokenForBullMQDashboard middleware, which validates the JWT but performs no role, permission, or workspace/organization scoping check; the mount also lies outside /api/v1/* so the global API gate does not apply. As a result, any authenticated user — including the lowest-privileged member of any tenant — can reach the full Bull-Board UI and view all queues and job payloads across the entire instance, including chat inputs and overrideConfig (which may carry credentials and prompts), chatflow.flowData graph definitions with custom function source code, credential IDs and system prompts, chatIds, files, and the originating orgId/workspaceId. The dashboard's write actions (retry, remove, promote, clean) are likewise usable across tenants. No patched version is available as of the advisory. |
| Flowise through 3.1.4 resolves SSO and local-password users solely by email without storing provider or subject identifier bindings, allowing attackers to authenticate as any existing user by claiming their email at any configured SSO provider. Attackers can gain complete account access including chatflows, credentials, and API keys by authenticating through a different SSO provider or local password than the victim's original registration method. |
| Flowise through 3.1.4 (Enterprise/platform mode with SSO enabled) contains an authentication bypass in the SSO login path. When an SSO callback arrives with an email matching a user whose status is INVITED, verifyAndLogin (SSOBase.ts:80-94) copies the user record from the database — including the server-stored single-use invitation tempToken — into the data passed to AccountService.register(). The register handler's token lookup, email match, and expiry checks therefore pass trivially against the server's own token instead of a caller-supplied one, and the account and its organization membership are flipped to ACTIVE. As a result, anyone able to authenticate at any configured SSO provider using a pending invitee's email address as the email claim can take over that invitation and obtain the invited user's access to the organization without ever possessing the emailed invitation token, for as long as the invitation is valid (24 hours by default). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available. |
| Flowise through 3.1.4 contains missing route-level RBAC checks on chat message endpoints that allow low-privileged API keys to read and delete chat history. Attackers with valid but low-privileged API keys can access GET and DELETE chat message routes without required flow permissions to read chat histories, prompts, model responses, and delete messages. |
| ClawHub (openclaw/clawhub) contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the ClawHub application/backend: an organization-owned skill retains the ownerUserId of its original publisher, and transfer and lifecycle authorization checks trust that historical user before requiring current organization privileges. An authenticated user who originally published an organization skill can therefore transfer, delete, or restore that skill — taking control of its trusted name and history — even after their organization privileges have been revoked or downgraded. The issue was confirmed at revision cbfee7343ddc867316dd9b3de6fa8856730f9f41; the complete historical affected range was not established. It is fixed by PR #3680, included in revision 8c2de6c506bb4efabe3f0c2ffb8370b9e23d4650, which was deployed to clawhub.ai on 2026-09-11; self-hosted deployments should update to that revision or a later descendant. The npm CLI and OpenClaw runtime are separate products and are not affected. |
