| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: atcspi200: fix use-after-free when driver unbind
DMA resource is initialized after SPI controller registration. So
when driver unbind, this can trigger a use-after-free when DMA is
torn down while the controller is still alive and triggers DMA transfers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: require a ref for locking_state debugfs open
debug_lockres_open() copies inode->i_private into struct debug_lockres and
debug_lockres_release() later drops that pointer with dlm_put(). That
only works if open successfully pins the struct dlm_ctxt.
Today open calls dlm_grab(dlm) but ignores its return value. Once the
last domain unregister has removed the context from dlm_domains,
dlm_grab() returns NULL, yet open still stores the raw pointer and returns
success. The later release path is outside the debugfs removal barrier,
so it can call dlm_put() after dlm_free_ctxt_mem() has freed the context.
KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free in dlm_put() called from
debug_lockres_release().
Fail the open when dlm_grab() cannot acquire the reference and unwind the
seq_file private state before returning. That keeps locking_state from
handing out a file descriptor whose release path does not own the
dlm_ctxt.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
locking_state debugfs open: last domain unregister:
1. debug_lockres_open() reads 1. dlm_unregister_domain() calls
inode->i_private. dlm_complete_dlm_shutdown().
2. debug_lockres_open() calls 2. shutdown removes the dlm_ctxt from
dlm_grab(dlm) and gets NULL. dlm_domains.
3. open still stores the raw dlm 3. final teardown reaches
pointer in dl->dl_ctxt and dlm_free_ctxt_mem() and frees it.
returns success.
4. debug_lockres_release() later
calls dlm_put(dl->dl_ctxt).
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in dlm_put+0x82/0x200
RIP: 0033:0x7f4d349bc9e0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888103a3c000 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 816 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region
[ffff888103a3c000, ffff888103a3c800)
Write of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
dlm_put+0x82/0x200 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?)
debug_lockres_release+0x53/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587)
dlm_put+0x9/0x200 (?:?)
debug_lockres_release+0x5c/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587)
full_proxy_release+0x67/0x90 (?:?)
__fput+0x1df/0x4b0 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_lock+0x10f/0x1b0 (?:?)
fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
__x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x10c/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
irqentry_exit+0xac/0x6e0 (?:?)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 (?:?)
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 (?:?)
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 (?:?)
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 (?:?)
kfree+0x30f/0x580 (?:?)
dlm_put+0x1ce/0x200 (?:?)
dlm_unregister_domain+0xf6/0xb30 (?:?)
o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0x6b/0x90 (?:?)
ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x41/0x70 (?:?)
ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x1c4/0x220 (?:?)
ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x38a/0x550 (?:?)
generic_shutdown_super+0xc3/0x220 (?:?)
kill_block_super+0x29/0x60 (?:?)
deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 (?:?)
cleanup_mnt+0x13d/0x210 (?:?)
task_work_run+0xfa/0x170 (?:?)
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd6/0x430 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x3cb/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: fix NPD in bo_meminfo()
When a buffer object is purged, its ttm.resource is set to NULL via the
TTM pipeline gutting flow. However, the BO remains in the client's
object list until userspace explicitly closes the GEM handle. If memory
stats are queried during this time, accessing bo->ttm.resource->mem_type
will result in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by safely skipping purged BOs in bo_meminfo, as they no longer
consume any memory.
User is getting NPD on device resume, and possible theory is that in
bo_move(), if we need to evict something to SYSTEM to save the CCS state,
but the BO is marked as dontneed, this won't trigger a move but will
nuke the pages, leaving us with a NULL bo resource. And the meminfo()
doesn't look ready to handle a NULL resource.
v2 (Sashiko):
- There could potentially be other cases where we might end up with a
NULL resource, so make this a general NULL check for now.
(cherry picked from commit c9a8e7daa0afe3161111e27fd92176e608c7f186) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: hold L2CAP conn across debugfs control
get_l2cap_conn() looks up an LE hci_conn under hdev protection, but
then drops that protection before reading hcon->l2cap_data and before
lowpan_control_write() later dereferences conn->hcon. A disconnect or
device close can tear down the same L2CAP connection in that window.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
6LoWPAN control write: HCI disconnect/device close:
1. get_l2cap_conn() finds hcon 1. hci_disconn_cfm() dispatches
and hcon->l2cap_data. the L2CAP disconnect callback.
2. get_l2cap_conn() drops hdev 2. l2cap_conn_del() clears
protection and returns conn. hcon->l2cap_data and drops the
L2CAP connection reference.
3. lowpan_control_write() reads 3. hci_conn_del() removes and drops
conn->hcon. the HCI connection.
Take a reference to the L2CAP connection with
l2cap_conn_hold_unless_zero() while hdev is still locked, and drop that
reference after the debugfs command's last use of conn. This mirrors the
existing L2CAP ACL receive-side handoff and keeps the connection
dereferenceable after leaving hdev protection. Export the existing helper
so the bluetooth_6lowpan module can use the same lifetime primitive.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_control_write+0x374/0x520
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111b9d000 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region
[ffff888111b9d000, ffff888111b9d400)
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x5f0
lowpan_control_write+0x374/0x520 (net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1131)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__debugfs_file_get+0xf7/0x400
full_proxy_write+0x9e/0xd0
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x810
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170
dnotify_flush+0x32/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
l2cap_conn_add+0x45/0x520
l2cap_chan_connect+0xac6/0xd90
l2cap_sock_connect+0x216/0x350
__sys_connect+0x101/0x130
__x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x313/0x590
hci_conn_hash_flush+0xc0/0x140
hci_dev_close_sync+0x41a/0xb00
hci_dev_close+0x12f/0x160
hci_sock_ioctl+0x157/0x570
sock_do_ioctl+0xf7/0x210
sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x490
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xc7/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa7/0xc0
insert_work+0x32/0x100
__queue_work+0x262/0xa60
queue_work_on+0xad/0xb0
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x4ef/0x670
hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x247/0x430
hci_event_packet+0x360/0x6f0
hci_rx_work+0x2ae/0x7a0
process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| Use after free in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| llama.cpp builds b7492 through the latest b9060 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the vocab pointer of llama-server when the --sleep-idle-seconds feature is enabled, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. Attackers can trigger the vulnerability by sending requests to affected endpoints while the server transitions to sleep mode, causing concurrent worker threads to dereference a freed vocab pointer that can be reclaimed with attacker-controlled data to achieve remote code execution. |
| Use after free in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: fix use-after-free caused by the fqdir_pre_exit() flush
On netns teardown, fqdir_pre_exit() walks the fqdir rhashtable and
flushes every fragment queue that is not yet complete using
inet_frag_queue_flush(). That helper frees all the skbs queued on the
fragment queue but does not set INET_FRAG_COMPLETE, and leaves
q->fragments_tail and q->last_run_head pointing at the freed skbs.
The queue itself stays in the rhashtable.
fqdir_pre_exit() first lowers high_thresh to 0 to stop new queue lookups,
but it cannot stop a fragment that already obtained the queue through
inet_frag_find() earlier and stalled just before taking the queue lock.
Once that fragment resumes after the flush and takes the queue lock,
it passes the INET_FRAG_COMPLETE check and then dereferences the freed
fragments_tail. inet_frag_queue_insert() reads FRAG_CB() and ->len of
that pointer and, on the append path, writes ->next_frag, causing a
slab use-after-free. IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm6 and 6lowpan reassembly
share the same flush path and are affected as well.
Reset rb_fragments, fragments_tail and last_run_head in
inet_frag_queue_flush() so a flushed queue no longer points at the
freed skbs. A fragment that resumes after the flush and takes the
queue lock then finds an empty queue and starts a new run instead of
dereferencing the freed fragments_tail. ip_frag_reinit() already
performed this reset after its own flush, so drop the now duplicate
code there. |
| Use after free in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) Miniport Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Work Folder Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Application Information Services allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges with a physical attack. |
| Use after free in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
