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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72889 | 1 Vurtdev | 1 Net-oauth | 2026-08-21 | N/A |
| Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75589 | 1 Vurtdev | 1 Net-oauth | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl check HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 and PLAINTEXT signatures with a non-constant-time comparison in verify. Each of the three compares the signature carried in the message against the locally computed one with the eq operator, which returns as soon as the two strings differ. The time taken to reject a signature varies with the length of the matching prefix. RSA-SHA1 is not affected, as it verifies through the RSA key object rather than by comparing strings. A client that can submit messages and time the replies may recover a valid signature one byte at a time rather than searching the whole signature space. Under PLAINTEXT the value compared against is the signature key itself, so the search recovers consumer_secret and token_secret. | ||||
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