Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.

The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.

This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Advisories

No advisories yet.

Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect. Restarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.

History

Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Title A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever
First Time appeared Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web
Weaknesses CWE-835
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z

Reserved: 2026-11-11T12:24:30.285Z

Link: CVE-2026-125275

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-17T03:17:00.513

Modified: 2026-11-17T03:17:00.513

Link: CVE-2026-125275

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses