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Affected Vendors & Products
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Wed, 07 Oct 2026 04:00:00 +0000
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Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssh |
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| Vendors & Products |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssh |
Wed, 07 Oct 2026 02:45:00 +0000
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| Description | wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDH_REPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key). | |
| Title | wolfSSH ECDSA host key curve not validated against negotiated algorithm | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-345 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: wolfSSL
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-07T11:17:14.029Z
Reserved: 2026-07-21T22:09:07.190Z
Link: CVE-2026-16516
Updated: 2026-10-07T11:15:59.263Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-07T03:16:58.830
Modified: 2026-10-07T12:17:09.483
Link: CVE-2026-16516
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-07T04:00:10Z