nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5 | nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 04 Sep 2026 19:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8. | |
| Title | nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-212 CWE-316 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-04T19:40:51.423Z
Reserved: 2026-06-09T19:39:52.404Z
Link: CVE-2026-53604
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-04T20:17:23.437
Modified: 2026-09-04T20:17:23.437
Link: CVE-2026-53604
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Github GHSA