uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Tue, 01 Sep 2026 22:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Erlang erlang/otp
Erlang otp |
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| Vendors & Products |
Erlang erlang/otp
Erlang otp |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Tue, 01 Sep 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits. uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4. | |
| Title | uri_string does not bound the port component of a URI before integer conversion | |
| First Time appeared |
Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1284 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp |
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| References |
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|
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-01T15:54:49.733Z
Reserved: 2026-07-06T14:05:47.003Z
Link: CVE-2026-59696
Updated: 2026-09-01T15:54:46.605Z
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-09-01T15:17:22.250
Modified: 2026-09-01T21:15:00.147
Link: CVE-2026-59696
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-01T16:00:13Z