Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.
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Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess. | |
| Title | Gitea repository migration SSRF through DNS rebinding | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Gitea
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-06T19:24:50.540Z
Reserved: 2026-08-13T16:50:59.173Z
Link: CVE-2026-70357
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-06T20:17:28.883
Modified: 2026-10-06T20:17:28.883
Link: CVE-2026-70357
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses