{}

{}

{}

{"affected_release": [{"advisory": "RHSA-2026:71113", "cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2.6::el9", "package": "automation-controller-0:4.7.17-1.el9ap", "product_name": "Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9", "release_date": "2026-09-23T00:00:00Z"}], "bugzilla": {"description": "automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: container group pod_spec_override mints the automation-controller ServiceAccount token and mounts control-plane namespace secrets into job pods, bypassing automountServiceAccountToken:false (control-plane secret and identity compromise)", "id": "2527190", "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2527190"}, "csaw": false, "cvss3": {"cvss3_base_score": "8.7", "cvss3_scoring_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "status": "verified"}, "cwe": "CWE-266", "details": ["A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. A user\nwith the delegated Instance Group Admin role on a container group can set a free-form\npod specification override that is deep-merged, without filtering, into every job pod\nlaunched on that group. The only hardening applied is forcing\nautomountServiceAccountToken to false, which does not remove an explicitly declared\nprojected serviceAccountToken volume or secret volume mounts. A non-superuser can\ntherefore cause the kubelet to mint a ServiceAccount token for the control-plane\nautomation-controller service account into the job container and mount arbitrary\nsecrets from the control-plane namespace, obtaining the control-plane service-account\nidentity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext control-plane secrets (including the\nplatform database password and Django SECRET_KEY), leading to full platform data\ncompromise."], "name": "CVE-2026-84708", "package_state": [{"cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "ansible-automation-platform-26/controller-rhel9", "product_name": "Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "ansible-automation-platform-27/controller-rhel9", "product_name": "Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2"}], "public_date": "2026-09-23T00:00:00Z", "references": ["https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-84708\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84708"], "statement": "This flaw affects automation-controller as shipped in Red Hat Ansible Automation\nPlatform deployments that use container groups (Kubernetes/OpenShift execution).\nExploitation requires an authenticated user with the Instance Group admin role on a\ncontainer group (superuser is not required). The impact is compromise of the\ncontrol-plane service-account identity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext disclosure of\ncontrol-plane namespace secrets \u2014 including the platform database password and Django\nSECRET_KEY \u2014 leading to full platform data compromise. The realized severity depends on\nwhether the deployment strips service-account-token volumes (tower#7523) and runs job\npods in a dedicated namespace with a reduced-RBAC service account (awx-operator#2122);\nboth were absent on the tested system. Red Hat recommends stripping projected\nserviceAccountToken and secret volumes from pod_spec_override at both the serializer and\nthe runtime dispatch, pinning serviceAccountName/namespace, and adopting the dedicated\njob namespace with minimal RBAC.", "threat_severity": "Important"}

{}