In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:

if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))

This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size

The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):

sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size

Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size

The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.

A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size
but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.

Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.
Advisories

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Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Thu, 24 Sep 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e() The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME header size: if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size)) This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each): sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) + name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used in the readdir path. A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary. Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup path.
Title ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-24T16:03:50.105Z

Reserved: 2026-09-24T14:53:16.869Z

Link: CVE-2026-97437

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-24T17:17:21.810

Modified: 2026-09-24T17:17:21.810

Link: CVE-2026-97437

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.