In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn

l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in
several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.

There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:

[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind
l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock
l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN)
chan->state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
lock_sock <------------------ release_sock
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT

l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state
is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second
__l2cap_chan_add.

Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with
WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is
l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on
chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so
there can be other TOCTOUC problems.

Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
Advisories

No advisories yet.

Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Mon, 02 Nov 2026 16:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup. There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add. Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems. Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
Title Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-02T16:06:43.262Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.403Z

Link: CVE-2026-99239

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-02T16:17:49.540

Modified: 2026-11-02T16:17:49.540

Link: CVE-2026-99239

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.