In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"),
I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace:
panic+0x58/0x5c
die+0x160/0x178
bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4
call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0
do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74
el1_brk64+0x34/0x54
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc
el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)
sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c
sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++
thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)
sync_file_ioctl()
sync_file_get_name()
dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name()
ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops)
if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e.
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL)
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops)
!= &drm_crtc_fence_ops)
+++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal,
which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON()
triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and
because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an
unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same
problem and is fixed by this patch as well.
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"),
I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace:
panic+0x58/0x5c
die+0x160/0x178
bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4
call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0
do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74
el1_brk64+0x34/0x54
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc
el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)
sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c
sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++
thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)
sync_file_ioctl()
sync_file_get_name()
dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name()
ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops)
if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e.
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL)
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops)
!= &drm_crtc_fence_ops)
+++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal,
which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON()
triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and
because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an
unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same
problem and is fixed by this patch as well.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name() Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"), I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly: Call trace: panic+0x58/0x5c die+0x160/0x178 bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4 call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0 do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74 el1_brk64+0x34/0x54 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88 drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P) sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following: +++ snip +++ thread A thread B ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) sync_file_ioctl() sync_file_get_name() dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops) if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e. drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED) RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL) drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops) != &drm_crtc_fence_ops) +++ snap +++ In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal, which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON() triggers. Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an unacceptable way to handle a failure. Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same problem and is fixed by this patch as well. | |
| Title | drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-20T05:51:37.186Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.433Z
Link: CVE-2026-99772
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-20T06:18:15.983
Modified: 2026-11-20T06:18:15.983
Link: CVE-2026-99772
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.