| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| DBI versions before 1.652 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds write via an unvalidated numeric placeholder that sets the binder counter in preparse.
preparse reserves seven output bytes per input byte, the width of the longest ':p99999' expansion. The ':N' branch parses the number with `atoi(src)` and assigns it to the binder counter with no range check, so a statement containing ':2147483648' leaves the counter negative (-2147483648 with glibc, where atoi wraps). Each following '?' then expands through `sprintf(start, ":p%d", idx++)` to ':p-2147483648', 14 bytes with the terminating NUL where the buffer budgets 7. The placeholder limit added in 1.650 tests the counter against 99,999, which a negative counter passes.
Any caller that preparses an untrusted statement into ':pN' style placeholders gets a heap out-of-bounds write that grows with the number of '?' marks following the poisoned placeholder. The '?' and '%s' return styles compare the parsed number against the expected sequence and error out, and are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ife: require ETH_HLEN to be pullable in ife_decode()
ife decode may return after making only the outer IFE header and
metadata pullable. The caller then passes the decapsulated packet to
eth_type_trans(), which expects the inner Ethernet header to be
accessible from the linear data area.
With a malformed IFE frame, the inner Ethernet header may still be
shorter than ETH_HLEN in the linear area, which can lead to a crash in
the original code.
Fix this by extending the pull check in ife_decode() so that the inner
Ethernet header is also guaranteed to be pullable before returning. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: iosm: bound device offsets in the MUX downlink decoder
mux_dl_adb_decode() walks a chain of aggregated datagram tables using
offsets and lengths taken from the modem. first_table_index,
next_table_index, table_length, datagram_index and datagram_length are
all device supplied le values. Only first_table_index was checked, and
only for being non zero. The decoder then formed adth = block +
adth_index and read the table header and the datagram entries with no
bound against the received skb. A modem that reports an index or a
length past the downlink buffer makes the decoder read out of bounds.
The buffer is IPC_MEM_MAX_DL_MUX_LITE_BUF_SIZE and skb->len is at most
that, so skb->len is the real limit, but none of these in band offsets
were checked against it.
The table chain is also followed with no forward progress check. The loop
takes the next table from adth->next_table_index and stops only when that
reaches zero. A modem can stage two tables that point at each other, so
the loop never ends. It runs in softirq and clones the skb on every pass.
Validate every device offset and length against skb->len before use.
The block header must fit. Each table header, on entry and after every
next_table_index, must lie inside the skb. The datagram table must fit.
Each datagram index and length must stay inside the skb. The header
padding must not exceed the datagram length so the receive length does
not wrap. Require each next_table_index to move forward so the chain
cannot cycle.
This was reproduced under KASAN as a slab out of bounds read on a normal
downlink receive once the iosm net device is up. |
| The Google Cloud Secret Manager secrets backend in Apache Airflow's Google provider never applied the team scope when resolving Connections and Variables: the caller's `team_name` was accepted by the backend but dropped at the internal call boundary, so every lookup resolved against the team-agnostic secret name. In a deployment running multi-team mode with this backend, a task or Dag belonging to one team resolved another team's Connection or Variable, obtaining its credentials in full. No unusual configuration is required beyond enabling multi-team mode and using this backend. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-google 22.3.0 or later, which builds and applies the team-scoped secret name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: guard mac_header adjustment after IPv6 defrag
nf_ct_frag6_reasm() slides the packet head forward to drop the IPv6
fragment header and then unconditionally advances skb->mac_header:
skb->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
On the NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT defrag path the skb has no link-layer header
yet, so skb->mac_header is still the "not set" sentinel (u16)~0U. Adding
sizeof(struct frag_hdr) wraps it to a small value (0xffff + 8 == 7),
after which skb_mac_header_was_set() wrongly reports a MAC header is
present and skb_mac_header() points into the headroom.
The reassembler has done this unconditional add since it was introduced;
it was harmless while mac_header was a bare pointer, but wrong once
mac_header became a u16 offset whose unset state is the ~0U sentinel
tested by skb_mac_header_was_set(). The sibling net/ipv6/reassembly.c
does the same relocation and does guard the adjustment; mirror the
guard here. |
| Numeric truncation error in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint
geneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(),
which honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT
(gs->gro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level
geneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally.
On a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain
ETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it
inflates gh_len by gro_hint->nested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch
type, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset
receive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153
ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)
geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965)
udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940)
inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621)
__gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306)
Gate the complete path on gs->gro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so
both paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: check the number of BDs needed for xdp_frame
The size of xdp_redirect_arr array is ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS. However, the
number of fragments contained in xdp_frame may be greater than or equal
to ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS, which will cause the access to xdp_redirect_arr
to be out of bounds. |
| IBM Db2 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.5 is vulnerable to buffer overflow in the IXF IMPORT parser. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gue: validate REMCSUM private option length
GUE private flags can indicate that remote checksum offload metadata is
present. The private flags field itself is accounted for by
guehdr_flags_len(), but guehdr_priv_flags_len() currently returns 0 even
when GUE_PFLAG_REMCSUM is set.
This lets a packet with only the private flags field pass
validate_gue_flags(), after which gue_remcsum() and gue_gro_remcsum()
read the missing REMCSUM start/offset fields from the following bytes.
Account for GUE_PLEN_REMCSUM when GUE_PFLAG_REMCSUM is present so that
malformed packets are rejected during option validation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: fix and simplify IP6IP6 tunnel handling
Fix nf_flow_ip6_tunnel_proto() to use pskb_may_pull() instead of
skb_header_pointer() to ensure the outer IPv6 header is in the skb
headroom, which is required for subsequent packet processing. Move
ctx->offset update inside the IPPROTO_IPV6 conditional block since it
should only be adjusted when an IP6IP6 tunnel is actually detected.
Simplify the rx path by removing ipv6_skip_exthdr() and checking
ip6h->nexthdr directly, as the flowtable fast path only handles simple
IP6IP6 encapsulation without extension headers.
Drop the tunnel encapsulation limit destination option support from the
tx path to match, since the rx path no longer handles extension headers.
Remove the encap_limit parameter from nf_flow_offload_ipv6_forward(),
nf_flow_tunnel_ip6ip6_push() and nf_flow_tunnel_v6_push(), along with
the ipv6_tel_txoption struct and related headroom/MTU adjustments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: fsl: fsl_audmix: Validate written enum values
fsl_audmix_put_mix_clk_src() and fsl_audmix_put_out_src()
convert the user-provided enum item with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val()
before checking whether the item is within the enum's item count.
The generic snd_soc_put_enum_double() helper performs that
validation, but these callbacks use the converted value first: the
clock-source path tests it with BIT(), and the output-source path
indexes the prms transition table with it.
Reject out-of-range enum items before converting them. |
| A weakness has been identified in Open Asset Import Library Assimp 17c12da. The affected element is the function Assimp::MDLImporter::ReadFaces_3DGS_MDL7 in the library code/AssetLib/LWO/LWOLoader.h of the component 3DGS MDL7 Model Parser. Executing a manipulation can lead to heap-based buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This patch is called ee77bb09a42a49843ac85ef64c14d2328b251df1. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue. |
| A vulnerability was detected in Edimax EW-7478APC 1.04. Affected is the function formWlSiteSurvey of the file /goform/formWlSiteSurvey. Performing a manipulation of the argument selSSID results in buffer overflow. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Numeric truncation error in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix BPF_PROG_QUERY OOB write and cgroup backward compat
BPF_PROG_QUERY writes back the 'query.revision' field unconditionally to
userspace. If userspace passes a smaller 'bpf_attr' structure (e.g. 40
bytes, which was the layout before the addition of 'query.revision'),
the kernel performs an out-of-bounds write.
Fix this by propagating the user-provided attribute size 'uattr_size'
down to the cgroup query handlers, and conditionally skipping writing
the revision field to userspace when the provided buffer size is
insufficient.
query.revision in bpf_mprog_query is structurally identical to the
cgroup case: a late tail field, written unconditionally.
But the backward-compat hazard is not the same.
The min-historical-size test is per command, and bpf_mprog_query only
serves attach types that were born with revision in the struct:
- tcx_prog_query -> BPF_TCX_INGRESS/EGRESS
- netkit_prog_query -> BPF_NETKIT_PRIMARY/PEER
tcx, netkit, the revision field, and bpf_mprog_query itself all landed in
the same v6.6 merge window (053c8e1f235d added the mprog query API +
revision; tcx in e420bed02507, netkit in 35dfaad7188c). There has never
been a tcx/netkit BPF_PROG_QUERY userspace that doesn't know about
revision. So for these commands the minimum legitimate struct already
covers offset 56-64 — no old binary can be broken here.
Contrast with cgroup: BPF_PROG_QUERY on cgroup attach types shipped in
2017; revision write-back was bolted on years later (120933984460). That
path has a real population of pre-revision callers. |
