| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix BUG_ON in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() due to stale blob size
The generic/642 test-case can reproduce the kernel crash:
[40243.605254] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[40243.605956] kernel BUG at fs/ceph/xattr.c:918!
[40243.607142] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[40243.608067] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 498762 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full)
[40243.609700] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[40243.611820] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
[40243.612715] RIP: 0010:__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x1b8/0x1e0
[40243.613731] Code: 0f 84 82 fe ff ff e9 cf 8e 56 ff 48 8d 65 e8 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 4c 8b 62 08 41 8b 85 24 07 00 00 49 83 c4 04 41 89 44 24 fc
[40243.616888] RSP: 0018:ffffcc80c4d4b688 EFLAGS: 00010287
[40243.617773] RAX: 0000000000010026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[40243.618928] RDX: ffff8a773798dee0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[40243.620158] RBP: ffffcc80c4d4b6a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[40243.621573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a75f3b58000
[40243.622907] R13: ffff8a75f3b58000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 000000000000bffd
[40243.624054] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a787d1b4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[40243.625331] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[40243.626269] CR2: 000072f390b623c0 CR3: 000000011c02a003 CR4: 0000000000372ef0
[40243.627408] Call Trace:
[40243.627839] <TASK>
[40243.628188] __prep_cap+0x3fd/0x4a0
[40243.628789] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4e/0xe0
[40243.629474] ceph_check_caps+0x46a/0xc80
[40243.630094] ? __lock_acquire+0x4a2/0x2650
[40243.630773] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90
[40243.631347] ? handle_cap_grant+0x79f/0x1060
[40243.632068] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.632696] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3e/0x340
[40243.633429] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.634052] handle_cap_grant+0xcf6/0x1060
[40243.634745] ceph_handle_caps+0x122b/0x2110
[40243.635415] mds_dispatch+0x5bd/0x2160
[40243.636034] ? ceph_con_process_message+0x65/0x190
[40243.636828] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.637431] ceph_con_process_message+0x7a/0x190
[40243.638184] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0
[40243.638749] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0
[40243.639268] process_message+0x16/0x1a0
[40243.639915] ? sg_free_table+0x39/0x90
[40243.640572] ceph_con_v2_try_read+0xf58/0x2120
[40243.641255] ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x300
[40243.641863] ceph_con_workfn+0x151/0x820
[40243.642493] process_one_work+0x22f/0x630
[40243.643093] ? process_one_work+0x254/0x630
[40243.643770] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x400
[40243.644332] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[40243.645020] kthread+0x109/0x140
[40243.645560] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.646125] ret_from_fork+0x3f8/0x480
[40243.646752] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.647316] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.647919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[40243.648556] </TASK>
[40243.648902] Modules linked in: overlay hctr2 libpolyval chacha libchacha adiantum libnh libpoly1305 essiv intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit kvm_intel kvm irqbypass joydev ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds mac_hid psmouse vga16fb serio_raw vgastate floppy i2c_piix4 pata_acpi bochs qemu_fw_cfg i2c_smbus sch_fq_codel rbd dm_crypt msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore
[40243.654766] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Commit d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS
maximum xattr size") moved the required_blob_size computation to before
the __build_xattrs() call, introducing a race.
__build_xattrs() releases and reacquires i_ceph_lock during execution.
In that window, handle_cap_grant() may update i_xattrs.blob with a
newer MDS-provided blob and bump i_xattrs.version. When
__bui
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: replace overzealous BUG_ON in osdmap_apply_incremental()
If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the incremental
osdmap epoch is different from what is expected, there is no need to
BUG. Instead, just declare the incremental osdmap to be invalid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in fence emission
sdma_v4_0_ring_emit_fence() contains two BUG_ON(addr & 0x3) assertions
that verify fence writeback addresses are dword-aligned. These
assertions can be reached from unprivileged userspace via crafted
DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_CS submissions, causing a fatal kernel panic in a
scheduler worker thread.
Replace both BUG_ON() calls with WARN_ON() to log the condition without
crashing the kernel. A misaligned fence address at this point indicates
a driver bug, but crashing the kernel is never the correct response when
the assertion is reachable from userspace.
The CS IOCTL path is the correct place to filter invalid submissions;
the ring emission callback is too late to do anything about it.
(cherry picked from commit b90250bd933afd1ba94d86d6b13821997b22b18e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: txgbe: fix RTNL assertion warning when remove module
For the copper NIC with external PHY, the driver called
phylink_connect_phy() during probe and phylink_disconnect_phy() during
remove. It caused an RTNL assertion warning in phylink_disconnect_phy()
upon module remove.
To fix this, add rtnl_lock() and rtnl_unlock() around the
phylink_disconnect_phy() in remove function.
------------[ cut here ]------------
RTNL: assertion failed at drivers/net/phy/phylink.c (2351)
WARNING: drivers/net/phy/phylink.c:2351 at
phylink_disconnect_phy+0xd8/0xf0 [phylink], CPU#0: rmmod/4464
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4464 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4+
Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7E16/X670E GAMING
PLUS WIFI (MS-7E16), BIOS 1.90 12/31/2024
RIP: 0010:phylink_disconnect_phy+0xe4/0xf0 [phylink]
Code: 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff e9 3a 38 8f e7
48 8d 3d 48 87 e2 ff ba 2f 09 00 00 48 c7 c6 c1 22 24 c0 <67> 48 0f b9 3a
e9 34 ff ff ff 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffce7288363ac0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff89654b2a1a00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000092f RSI: ffffffffc02422c1 RDI: ffffffffc0239020
RBP: ffffce7288363ae8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8964c4022000
R13: ffff89654fce3028 R14: ffff89654ebb4000 R15: ffffffffc0226348
FS: 0000795e80d93780(0000) GS:ffff896c52857000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005b528b592000 CR3: 0000000170d0f000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
txgbe_remove_phy+0xbb/0xd0 [txgbe]
txgbe_remove+0x4c/0xb0 [txgbe]
pci_device_remove+0x41/0xb0
device_remove+0x43/0x80
device_release_driver_internal+0x206/0x270
driver_detach+0x4a/0xa0
bus_remove_driver+0x83/0x120
driver_unregister+0x2f/0x60
pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
txgbe_driver_exit+0x10/0x850 [txgbe]
__do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x1c3/0x2f0
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x12/0x20
x64_sys_call+0x20c3/0x2390
do_syscall_64+0x11c/0x1500
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_syscall_64+0x15a/0x1500
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_fault+0x312/0x580
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __handle_mm_fault+0x9d5/0x1040
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? count_memcg_events+0x101/0x1d0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? handle_mm_fault+0x1e8/0x2f0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2f8/0x820
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x600
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
romfs: check sb_set_blocksize() return value
romfs_fill_super() ignores the return value of sb_set_blocksize(), which
can fail if the requested block size is incompatible with the block
device's configuration.
This can be triggered by setting a loop device's block size larger than
PAGE_SIZE using ioctl(LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE, 32768), then mounting a romfs
filesystem on that device.
When sb_set_blocksize(sb, ROMBSIZE) is called with ROMBSIZE=4096 but the
device has logical_block_size=32768, bdev_validate_blocksize() fails
because the requested size is smaller than the device's logical block
size. sb_set_blocksize() returns 0 (failure), but romfs ignores this and
continues mounting.
The superblock's block size remains at the device's logical block size
(32768). Later, when sb_bread() attempts I/O with this oversized block
size, it triggers a kernel BUG in folio_set_bh():
kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1582!
BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
Fix by checking the return value of sb_set_blocksize() and failing the
mount with -EINVAL if it returns 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Remove user triggerable WARN_ON() in mana_ib_create_qp_rss()
Sashiko points out that the user can specify WQs sharing the same CQ as a
part of the uAPI and this will trigger the WARN_ON() then go on to corrupt
the kernel.
Just reject it outright and fail the QP creation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE when accessing forward path array
Although unlikely, recent support for IPIP tunnels increases chances of
reaching this WARN_ON_ONCE if userspace manages to build a sufficiently
long forward path.
Remove it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg
ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()`
(local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type
`__u16`) and
- a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`)
when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
- `include/net/ipv6.h`:
- `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible).
(lines 291-307, especially 298)
- `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`:
- Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen`
without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`:
- Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header
sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`:
- Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero.
(lines 1930-1934)
- `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`:
- Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the
pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)
1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:
- `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.
2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs
and increments `opt_flen` each time:
- In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`:
- It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);`
- It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)
- Then it does:
- `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927)
- `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy
`IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at
`net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).
If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps
while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte)
destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):
- 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048`
- 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8`
- Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8`
- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.
3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`:
- `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`
With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate
what will be pushed later.
4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from
`dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`:
- `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);`
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes
`dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`.
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does:
- `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
- `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers
`skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`:
- `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`)
- `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)
- The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target
netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`).
- Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user
namespaces.
- An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged
user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain
namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).
- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).
-
---truncated--- |
| nghttp2 is an implementation of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 in C. Prior to version 1.68.1, the nghttp2 library stops reading the incoming data when user facing public API `nghttp2_session_terminate_session` or `nghttp2_session_terminate_session2` is called by the application. They might be called internally by the library when it detects the situation that is subject to connection error. Due to the missing internal state validation, the library keeps reading the rest of the data after one of those APIs is called. Then receiving a malformed frame that causes FRAME_SIZE_ERROR causes assertion failure. nghttp2 v1.68.1 adds missing state validation to avoid assertion failure. No known workarounds are available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles
Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.
The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.
There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.
The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.
The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.
Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is
mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels < v6.6.
Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit.
Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to
v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels < v6.6. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject root items with drop_progress and zero drop_level
[BUG]
When recovering relocation at mount time, merge_reloc_root() and
btrfs_drop_snapshot() both use BUG_ON(level == 0) to guard against
an impossible state: a non-zero drop_progress combined with a zero
drop_level in a root_item, which can be triggered:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1545!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 283 ... Tainted: 6.18.0+ #16 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2, BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2
RIP: 0010:merge_reloc_root+0x1266/0x1650 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1545
Code: ffff0000 00004589 d7e9acfa ffffe8a1 79bafebe 02000000
Call Trace:
merge_reloc_roots+0x295/0x890 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1861
btrfs_recover_relocation+0xd6e/0x11d0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4195
btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xa4d/0x1810 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3130
open_ctree+0x5824/0x5fe0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3640
btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:987 [inline]
btrfs_get_tree_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1951 [inline]
btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2094 [inline]
btrfs_get_tree+0x111c/0x2190 fs/btrfs/super.c:2128
vfs_get_tree+0x9a/0x370 fs/super.c:1758
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1199 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3642 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3718 [inline]
path_mount+0x5b8/0x1ea0 fs/namespace.c:4028
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4041 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4229 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4206 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x320 fs/namespace.c:4206
...
RIP: 0033:0x7f969c9a8fde
Code: 0f1f4000 48c7c2b0 fffffff7 d8648902 b8ffffff ffc3660f
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The bug is reproducible on 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260310 with our dynamic
metadata fuzzing tool that corrupts btrfs metadata at runtime.
[CAUSE]
A non-zero drop_progress.objectid means an interrupted
btrfs_drop_snapshot() left a resume point on disk, and in that case
drop_level must be greater than 0 because the checkpoint is only
saved at internal node levels.
Although this invariant is enforced when the kernel writes the root
item, it is not validated when the root item is read back from disk.
That allows on-disk corruption to provide an invalid state with
drop_progress.objectid != 0 and drop_level == 0.
When relocation recovery later processes such a root item,
merge_reloc_root() reads drop_level and hits BUG_ON(level == 0). The
same invalid metadata can also trigger the corresponding BUG_ON() in
btrfs_drop_snapshot().
[FIX]
Fix this by validating the root_item invariant in tree-checker when
reading root items from disk: if drop_progress.objectid is non-zero,
drop_level must also be non-zero. Reject such malformed metadata with
-EUCLEAN before it reaches merge_reloc_root() or btrfs_drop_snapshot()
and triggers the BUG_ON.
After the fix, the same corruption is correctly rejected by tree-checker
and the BUG_ON is no longer triggered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drbd: fix "LOGIC BUG" in drbd_al_begin_io_nonblock()
Even though we check that we "should" be able to do lc_get_cumulative()
while holding the device->al_lock spinlock, it may still fail,
if some other code path decided to do lc_try_lock() with bad timing.
If that happened, we logged "LOGIC BUG for enr=...",
but still did not return an error.
The rest of the code now assumed that this request has references
for the relevant activity log extents.
The implcations are that during an active resync, mutual exclusivity of
resync versus application IO is not guaranteed. And a potential crash
at this point may not realizs that these extents could have been target
of in-flight IO and would need to be resynced just in case.
Also, once the request completes, it will give up activity log references it
does not even hold, which will trigger a BUG_ON(refcnt == 0) in lc_put().
Fix:
Do not crash the kernel for a condition that is harmless during normal
operation: also catch "e->refcnt == 0", not only "e == NULL"
when being noisy about "al_complete_io() called on inactive extent %u\n".
And do not try to be smart and "guess" whether something will work, then
be surprised when it does not.
Deal with the fact that it may or may not work. If it does not, remember a
possible "partially in activity log" state (only possible for requests that
cross extent boundaries), and return an error code from
drbd_al_begin_io_nonblock().
A latter call for the same request will then resume from where we left off. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: thp: deny THP for files on anonymous inodes
file_thp_enabled() incorrectly allows THP for files on anonymous inodes
(e.g. guest_memfd and secretmem). These files are created via
alloc_file_pseudo(), which does not call get_write_access() and leaves
inode->i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) being
true, they appear as read-only regular files when
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, making them eligible for THP
collapse.
Anonymous inodes can never pass the inode_is_open_for_write() check
since their i_writecount is never incremented through the normal VFS
open path. The right thing to do is to exclude them from THP eligibility
altogether, since CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was designed for real
filesystem files (e.g. shared libraries), not for pseudo-filesystem
inodes.
For guest_memfd, this allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create
large folios in the page cache via the collapse path, but the
guest_memfd fault handler does not support large folios. This triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().
For secretmem, collapse_file() tries to copy page contents through the
direct map, but secretmem pages are removed from the direct map. This
can result in a kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88810284d000
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
Call Trace:
collapse_file
hpage_collapse_scan_file
madvise_collapse
Secretmem is not affected by the crash on upstream as the memory failure
recovery handles the failed copy gracefully, but it still triggers
confusing false memory failure reports:
Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean unevictable
LRU page: Recovered
Check IS_ANON_FILE(inode) in file_thp_enabled() to deny THP for all
anonymous inode files. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/io-pgtable-arm: fix size_t signedness bug in unmap path
__arm_lpae_unmap() returns size_t but was returning -ENOENT (negative
error code) when encountering an unmapped PTE. Since size_t is unsigned,
-ENOENT (typically -2) becomes a huge positive value (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE
on 64-bit systems).
This corrupted value propagates through the call chain:
__arm_lpae_unmap() returns -ENOENT as size_t
-> arm_lpae_unmap_pages() returns it
-> __iommu_unmap() adds it to iova address
-> iommu_pgsize() triggers BUG_ON due to corrupted iova
This can cause IOVA address overflow in __iommu_unmap() loop and
trigger BUG_ON in iommu_pgsize() from invalid address alignment.
Fix by returning 0 instead of -ENOENT. The WARN_ON already signals
the error condition, and returning 0 (meaning "nothing unmapped")
is the correct semantic for size_t return type. This matches the
behavior of other io-pgtable implementations (io-pgtable-arm-v7s,
io-pgtable-dart) which return 0 on error conditions. |
| go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.3.1, if the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic during parsing, causing a denial of service. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key. Version 2.3.1 fixes the issue. No known workarounds are available. |
| A reachable assertion in FFmpeg git-master commit N-113007-g8d24a28d06 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via opening a crafted AAC file. |
| atop through 2.11.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service (e.g., assertion failure and application exit) or possibly have unspecified other impact by running certain types of unprivileged processes while a different user runs atop. |
| When an incoming DNS protocol message includes a Transaction Signature (TSIG), BIND always checks it. If the TSIG contains an invalid value in the algorithm field, BIND immediately aborts with an assertion failure.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.8 and 9.21.0 through 9.21.7. |
| A vulnerability was found in HTACG tidy-html5 5.8.0. It has been rated as problematic. This issue affects the function prvTidyParseNamespace of the file src/parser.c. The manipulation leads to reachable assertion. Attacking locally is a requirement. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Vnet/IP Interface Package provided by Yokogawa Electric Corporation.
If affected product receives maliciously crafted packets, Vnet/IP software stack process may be terminated.
The affected products and versions are as follows: Vnet/IP Interface Package (for CENTUM VP R6 VP6C3300, CENTUM VP R7 VP7C3300) R1.07.00 or earlier |
