| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size
CRIU checkpoint copies the MQD control stack using cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size
from hardware without bounding it to the allocated BO region. If the HW
field is larger than the queue's control stack allocation, memcpy reads
past the BO into adjacent GTT memory and can leak kernel data to userspace.
Store the page-aligned control stack BO size in mqd_manager and clamp
checkpoint copies and reported checkpoint sizes to
min(cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size, mm->ctl_stack_size). Apply the same bound
for multi-XCC v9.4.3 checkpoint layout.
(cherry picked from commit 6c2abd0ec09e86c6323010673766f76050e28aa3) |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 0.29.2, the experimental dynamic client registration and client ID metadata document features in the @backstage/plugin-auth-backend use full-string matcher.isMatch glob matching for auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration.allowedRedirectUriPatterns and the auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments allowedClientIdPatterns and allowedRedirectUriPatterns options. A hostname wildcard can match across URL component boundaries, allowing an attacker-controlled redirect URI with a trusted hostname suffix in its path to pass the allowlist and receive an OAuth authorization code after a victim completes the flow. Patterns without an explicit protocol can match unintended protocols, and redirect URIs containing embedded credentials are accepted after user information is stripped for matching. The features are experimental and disabled by default; only deployments that enable them and configure custom wildcard-hostname or protocol-less patterns are affected. This issue is first fixed in prerelease version 0.29.2. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count
rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with
min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but
rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query
register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and
input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode
points at the 6-entry allocation.
A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled
therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and
out-of-bounds read/write through the EVIOCGKEYCODE/EVIOCSKEYCODE ioctls,
which bound the index only against keycodemax. This is the same defect
as the F3A handler, which was copied from F30.
Size the keymap for the full gpioled_count; the mapping loop still
assigns only the first min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows SMB Client allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| ColdFusion is affected by a Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploit depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. |
| ELAN reported a potential out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the ELAN TrackPoint driver that, under certain circumstances, could allow a local authenticated user to cause a system crash. |
| In Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) before 10.1.17, weak cryptographic key generation vulnerability exists in the OnlyOffice integration. The zimbraDocumentEditingJwtSecret is generated using an insecure random number generator, resulting in insufficient entropy. An attacker who obtains a JWT signed with the generated secret may be able to recover the JWT signing secret through offline brute-force, potentially enabling JWT forgery. |
| The device's PROFINET service is affected by a buffer overflow vulnerability that exists in the default configuration. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to reboot the device or execute arbitrary code. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
