| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Neo4j's Bolt modern handshake decoder treats an overlong capability bit mask the same way it treats a truncated bit mask. When an unauthenticated client sends a selected protocol version followed by 32 continuation bytes in the capability mask, the decoder resets the reader index and waits for more bytes instead of rejecting the protocol message and closing the channel.
Because the same unread bytes remain at the front of the decoder buffer, appending a terminating byte later does not recover the connection. The decoder re-reads the same first 32 continuation bytes, returns without producing a handshake-finalization message, and leaves the channel open.
This can be triggered before authentication by any client that can reach the Bolt connector. |
| A vulnerability in the XAR file format parser of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition or possibly other expanded impacts as a result of memory corruption on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper boundary checks for content in XAR files during scanning. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted file that contains XAR content to be scanned by ClamAV on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV scanning process to terminate, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. A signed integer overflow vulnerability exists in the `file-fli` plugin when processing FLI image files. This occurs due to an incorrect calculation during memory allocation for image buffers, where the multiplication of image width and height can exceed the maximum integer value. A remote attacker could exploit this by tricking a user into opening a specially crafted FLI file, leading to the application crashing and resulting in a denial of service. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP's PSD file format plugin. This vulnerability, an unsigned integer underflow in the `block_rem` variable, occurs when a user opens a specially crafted `.psd` image file. The underflow leads to parser confusion, enabling an attacker to inject arbitrary data as layer resource blocks. This can ultimately result in arbitrary code execution, allowing the attacker to run malicious code on the victim's system. |
| Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 1.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, HandleSecureMessage() in src/remoted/secure.c passes a pointer inside its stack buffer to ReadSecMSG(), and src/os_crypto/shared/msgs.c decompresses up to OS_MAXSTR bytes at that offset. For an encrypted agent message on TCP port 1514 that expands to 65,536 bytes, os_zlib_uncompress() writes a terminating null byte beyond the end of the destination buffer. The resulting stack out-of-bounds write in the root-level remoted daemon can crash message processing and disrupt agent communications. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2. |
| Power Systems Firmware FW1120.00, FW1110.00 through FW1110.30, and FW1060.00 through FW1060.80 is affected by a vulnerability in the host firmware boot process image validation path. An attacker with service access to the service processor can supply a maliciously crafted code update image, allowing arbitrary code to be executed on the host system. Successful exploitation could result in a confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact to the affected host system. |
| Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.5.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, compare_wazuh_versions() in src/shared/version_op.c copies the attacker-controlled enrollment V: field into a 10-byte stack buffer with strncpy() but does not explicitly terminate the buffer. The function is reachable before authentication through wazuh-authd on TCP port 1515 when anonymous TLS enrollment is enabled. A version string of at least nine non-null bytes can cause strchr() and strtok() to read beyond ver2 and can make strtok() write a null byte into adjacent stack memory, allowing a remote denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability was identified in TP-Link Tapo C100/C101 v5, C520WS v2.6 in the HTTP POST body parsing logic due to missing validation of remaining buffer capacity after dynamic allocation, due to insufficient boundary validation when handling externally supplied HTTP input.
An attacker
on the same network segment could trigger heap memory corruption conditions by
sending crafted payloads that cause write operations beyond allocated buffer
boundaries. Successful exploitation
causes a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition, causing the device’s process to
crash or become unresponsive. |
| Orval generates type-safe JavaScript clients in TypeScript from OpenAPI v3 and Swagger v2 specifications. Prior to 8.21.0, a ${...} expression or backtick in an enum default is emitted into a module-level template literal emitted by zod schema generation without safe encoding. This permits attacker-controlled JavaScript to be evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, resulting in code execution in the developer, CI, test, or application environment. The affected code is packages/zod/src/index.ts function formatDefaultValue. This issue is fixed in version 8.21.0. |
| FFmpeg before commit 1c10bcc contains a heap buffer overflow in the RIST protocol reader (libavformat/librist.c). librist_read() ignored its size argument and copied the full received payload length into the caller-provided destination buffer, overflowing it when the payload exceeds the destination size. This is reachable via the async:rist:// URL scheme, where the async wrapper supplies a smaller buffer than the received payload. A remote RIST sender can trigger the overflow by sending a packet whose payload exceeds the caller buffer size. |
| FFmpeg before commit 9d786e4 contains a stack buffer overflow in the MPEG-PS muxer (libavformat/mpegenc.c). When muxing input with more streams than the muxer's fixed-size stack buffer accommodates, the buffer is overflowed. A crafted input with an excessive number of streams triggers the overflow during MPEG-PS muxing. |
| A stack buffer overflow was found in Internationl components for unicode (ICU ). While running the genrb binary, the 'subtag' struct overflowed at the SRBRoot::addTag function. This issue may lead to memory corruption and local arbitrary code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()
For description-level chunks keyring_get_key_chunk() advances the read
pointer by level * sizeof(long) past the inline prefix but only
bounds-checks the prefix, so a long enough key description is read past
its kmemdup(desc, desc_len + 1) allocation. Compute the full byte
offset and bounds-check the description against it before reading.
The walk only reaches a description-level chunk when two keys collide
through the hash, x, type and domain_tag chunks, so this is reached from
an unprivileged add_key(2) with a crafted pair of same-type keys whose
index hashes collide; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer
iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types
into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for
ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP,
REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU
whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.
The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its
data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via
iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The
only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the
initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly
negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target
that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and
max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer.
Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly
like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data
when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the
opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Fix number of temperature registers for NCT6116
Unlike NCT6106, NCT6116 only has three temperature registers, and with
it only three temperature source and temperature source configuration
registers. The register addresses match those of NCT6106 and can be
re-used.
The code used a separate array to list the temperature source registers
for NCT6116, but used the size of the NCT6106 register array to set
the number of registers. The NCT6106 register array provides six addresses,
while the temperature source register array for NCT6116 only provides three
addresses. This causes a KASAN report.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffffc19561a6 by task modprobe/954
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7d/0xa7
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x194/0x5b0
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
...
Fix the problem by hard-coding the number of temperature and temperature
configuration registers to three for NCT6116. Drop the unnecessary
NCT6116_REG_TEMP_SOURCE array and re-use NCT6106_REG_TEMP_SOURCE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (adt7470) Fix busy-loop and I2C flooding in update thread
When userspace configures 'auto_update_interval' to 0 via sysfs, the
background kthread executes schedule_timeout_interruptible(0), which
returns immediately.
If 'num_temp_sensors' is concurrently or previously set to 0, the
msleep_interruptible() delay inside adt7470_read_temperatures() also
becomes 0. This combination forces the background thread into a tight,
unbounded busy-loop, hogging the CPU and flooding the I2C bus with a
continuous stream of transactions.
Fix this vulnerability by raising the lower limit of the clamp_val in
auto_update_interval_store() from 0 to 500 milliseconds. This guarantees
a reasonable minimum sleep window between sensor updates, protecting the
system from intentional or accidental I2C bus denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter
The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that
separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate
even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that
same delimiter:
memset(buf + count, del, 8);
Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and
happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of
scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag
characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is
none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.
If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts
as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps
reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is
not a flag character. For example registering
PaPEPPxPPiP
with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x",
interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end
of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the
parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of
bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the
scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a
slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to
unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without
privileges.
Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a
registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds
read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))
(or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.
However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so
skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20)
only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of
IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear
frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled
linear buffer length.
Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to
the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.
A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.
Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.
ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow
sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count
for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to
zero.
SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload,
then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list.
After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes
8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.
Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform
the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues
to return its existing transport at the limit. |
