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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64623 | 2 Jovancoding, Network-ai | 2 Network-ai, Network-ai | 2026-08-14 | 8.6 High |
| Network-AI before 5.13.4 contains an improper cryptographic signature verification vulnerability in APSAdapter where the default local verifier accepts any non-empty string as valid. Unauthenticated attackers can submit forged APS delegation payloads with arbitrary scopes to bypass signature verification and obtain signed permission-grant tokens for sensitive resources including SHELL_EXEC. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64622 | 2 Jovancoding, Network-ai | 2 Network-ai, Network-ai | 2026-08-14 | 7.5 High |
| Network-AI (npm: network-ai) versions 5.12.2 through 5.13.3 fail to apply the configured authorization check (checkAuth/secret) to the ApprovalInbox GET read routes, so even when an operator configures a secret, unauthenticated actors can access sensitive approval request details. The GET /approvals/?status=all, GET /approvals/:id, GET /approvals/stats, and GET /approvals/sse routes disclose full ApprovalEntry content including action/target shell-command strings, file paths, justifications, and risk levels. All responses also carry a hardcoded Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header, enabling cross-origin disclosure from any website the operator visits. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj. | ||||
| CVE-2026-54051 | 1 Jovancoding | 1 Network-ai | 2026-07-21 | 9.9 Critical |
| Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design. | ||||
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